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INTRODUCTION 
The present study seeks to understand how the human 
subject may attempt to influence the learning process on 
the basis of what he knows, or assumes that he knows, 
about what is to be learned. While traditional verbal 
learning research has generally emphasized the effects 
that stimulus characteristics and presentation conditions 
have on learning, the present concern is with how the sub-
ject might use knowledge about learning in general, or 
knowledge about the specific to-be-learned material, to 
affect subsequent encoding and retrieval. 
The adult human subject brings to the learning sit-
uation numerous verbal habits and substantial knowledge 
of associative relationships that have been acquired 
through a history of processing verbal material. These 
habits and information undoubtedly influence what is 
actually learned. For example, research on stimulus 
selection has revealed that the nominal (experimenter-
defined) stimulus is not always identical to that stim-
. ulus the subject employs (Underwood, Ham, & Ekstrand, 
1962). The distinction between nominal and functional 
stimuli is necessary since it is apparent that the 
learner may "modify" the learning situation so that 
1 
2 
more meaningful elements of the stimulus array or more 
easily associated stimuli are acquired. Stimulus selec-
tion, therefore, is one obvious example of subjects bring-
ing to the learning ta~k habits which may influence how 
the to-be-learned material is encoded. 
The adult learner may also change or adjust his man-
ner of encoding on the basis of his judged progress toward 
an immediate learning goal. For example, the student who 
begins reading a difficult chapter in a textbook, gets 
halfway through the first page and says, "I am not under-
standing this.", and then begins again reading more slowly, 
is exhibiting this kind of behavior. 
An experiment by Woodsen (1974) provides an illustra-
tion of how subjects may let future encoding activity be 
determined by successful behavior in the task. The task 
was to learn the English equivalents of 50 Japanese words 
under an anticipation method of paired-associate learning. 
Following one presentation of each of the 50 Japanese-
English word pairs, the Japanese words were divided into 
five 10-item lists. The lists remained in the subject's 
view throughout the learning session which lasted approx-
imately 2 hours. The subject was then asked the English 
equivalent of one of the Japanese words from each list, 
beginning with the leftmost list and proceeding across 
the five lists, with this procedure repeated constantly 
throughout the session. The subject responded to one 
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word at a time and was instructed to type his response on 
a teletype joined to a computer which was programmed to 
record the responses and display the correct English equiv-
alent if the subject erred. The manner in which the next 
item was selected was the major independent variable (only 
two of the six different selection procedures are partic-
ularly relevant to the present discussion). One group was 
allowed to select the next Japanese word for testing and 
was given specific instructions regarding its selection. 
Subjects were specifically encouraged to select from those 
items which they felt they did not yet know. Another group 
was not given the opportunity to select items. For sub-
jects in this group, the computer was programmed to dis-
play one item which had not been correctly anticipated on 
two successive trials. Subjects in these two groups per-
formed substantially better on a test of retention given 
one week later than did all other subjects in the exper-
iment (including subjects allowed to select items under 
no specific instructions). Therefore, the strategy of 
allocating study time to those items which were not yet 
learned, or which the subject himself judged to be not 
learned, proved to be quite successful. Since the sub-
ject himself, in at least one condition, guided the se-
lection of "not yet known" items, this study illustrates 
the subject's ability to let success under the current 
learning conditions determine future encoding. 
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The ability to "know what you know" may best be viewed 
as a self-regulatory process. At some time in the learning 
process, the subject will likely ask himself, "Do I know 
this material well enough to remember it later?" It is on 
the basis of a negative answer that to this question that 
subsequent mnemonic activity follows. On the other hand, 
if the learner answers "yes" to this question, processing 
is likely to cease. Since current theoretical emphasis is 
placed on the activities of the learner (Jenkins, 1974), 
such self-regulatory abilities are of increasing impor-
tance. Tulving and Madigan (1970), for example have sug-
gested that any theory of memory must include an analysis 
of the relation between the information stored in memory 
and the learner's awareness of what is stored. 
Judgments of Knowing. Requiring the subject to judge 
what he knows during learning, and then later testing the 
veracity of these judgments, is a method of demonstrating 
his capacity for self-regulation. A judgment of knowing 
(JK) can be defined as a subjectivity rated likelihood of 
later retention of presently studied information. The 
time of the rating is crucial to the definition. Since 
retention tasks generally entail a study phase and a test 
phase, the JK response is, by definition, made during the 
study phase and before the test phase. For the purposes 
of the present discussion, both explicit and implicit JKs 
will be considered. 
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One example of the use of explicit JKs in the study 
of human memory is an experiment by Arbuckle and Cuddy 
(1969). Subjects learned a long series of short PA lists. 
As each pair was prese~ted for study, the subjects were 
required to respond "YES" indicating that they would get 
the item correct or "NO" indicating that they would not 
get the item correct. Test trials immediately followed 
the single study trials. It was found that subjects 
could accurately predict recall or non-recall at greater 
chance levels. Furthermore, an additional group of sub-
jects was asked to rate each pair on its ease or diffi-
culty of learning. It was found that apparent difficulty 
of the pair was related to the probability of predicting 
correct recall. This was interpreted to mean that sub-
jects were assessing the strength of the associative con-
nection between stimulus and response terms at the time 
of presentation and were using this information as a basis 
for the prediction. More will be said about the use of 
item characteristics as a basis for JKs later in this in-
troduction. 
A second example of the use of explicit JKs is an ex-
periment by Zechmeister and Shaughnessy (Note 1) in which 
subjects were asked to make JK ratings of individual items 
during the learning of a lengthy free-recall list. Rated 
items in the study list were either once- or twice-present-
ed items, the latter having been presented under massed or 
distributed conditions. Of experimental concern was the 
degree to which the JK ratings matched actual recall for 
both massed and distributed items. 
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Under such so-called MP-DP presentations, recall for 
massed items is generally lower than recall for distrib-
uted items (Shaughnessy, Zimmerman, & Underwood, 1972), a 
so-called "spacing effect." An attentional explanation of 
this phenomenon says that subjects are less likely to con-
tinue processing of the second presentation of an item 
under massed presentation than under distributed presen-
tation (see Hintzman, 1974, for a review of this and other 
explanations of the spacing effect). It was suggested that 
subjects shift attention because they overestimate their 
memory for massed items relative to distributed items, and 
differences in JK ratings would reflect this perceived dif-
ference in the judged likelihood of recall. 
The results of the Zechmeister and Shaughnessy study 
indicated that subjects could make JK ratings with some 
degree of accuracy. Once-presented items were rated lower 
(less likelihood of recall) than twice-presented items, 
and recall was, in fact, lower for once- than twice-pre-
sented items. Furthermore, the hypothesis regarding the 
ratings of massed versus distributed items was upheld in 
that, although massed items were recalled significantly 
less than distributed items, massed items received ratings 
similar to distributed items. This suggests that the 
subjects might have been "misled" by the presentation con-
ditions, and the attentional explanation of the spacing 
effect was supported. 
A JK is a request for an assessment of how success-
fully an item has been stored in memory. It is assumed 
that one purpose such a judgment might serve during learn-
ing is that processing time may be allocated to items on 
the basis of this judgment. Experimental paradigms which 
allow the assessment of the subject's distribution of at-
tention can be viewed, therefore, as examples of implicit 
judgments regarding the memory for an item. 
A common finding is that the number of items learned 
during a certain interval is invariant regardless of the 
distribution of presentation times within the interval 
(Cooper & Pantle, 1967). Zacks (1969) was interested in 
testing the generality of this law of "total time invar-
iance" when subjects were given increased control over 
presentation and testing conditions during the learning 
of two lists of paired associates. That is, study time 
was either free (subject-paced) or constrained (experi-
menter-paced), and the order of study and test trials was 
either free (subject-controlled) or constrained (experi-
menter controlled). Conditions for the learning of the 
first list represented a factorial combination of these 
two factors. The second list was learned under one of 
two conditions; either constrained study time and 
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ordering of study and test trials, or free study time and 
ordering of study of test trials. Thus there were eight 
groups in the experiment. Learning was to a criterion of 
one perfect trial. 
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Some of the results reported by Zacks are especially 
important to the present discussion. In a paired-associate 
list, one would not expect all items to be of equal diffi-
culty, and thus subjects might spend more time on items 
perceived as difficult. To test this notion, for each sub-
ject Zacks ranked the items according to performance across 
all learning trials (ranking was from fewest to most errors). 
Similarly, the study times for each of the items were ranked 
for each subject. A positive rank-order correlation would 
indicate that more time was spent on difficult than easy 
items. For List 1 learning, the average median correlation 
across all groups was .66, for List 2, .72. Thus the sub-
jects were appropriately allowing more study time to diffi-
cult items; and furthermore, with experience at the task, 
there was a slightly stronger relationship between time and 
item difficulty. 
One would also expect that for a given pair, study time 
would be longer if an error was committed on the previous 
attempt than if the previous test was successful. Indeed, 
Zacks reported that the mean study time following an error 
was twice as long as that following a correct response. 
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One cannot claim that these findings unambi~uously 
demonstrate that subjects were making implicit JKs. How-
ever, a relationship is suggested. That is, it appeared 
that subjects were allocating study time "as if" they were 
asking themselves whether or not they knew a pair well 
enough. This is an assumption which is important to later 
discussion. 
Zacks employed a transfer paradigm to examine whether 
subjects under self-paced conditions learned specific 
"skills" which would aid future learning. Since self-paced 
and experimenter-paced presentations led to equal rates of 
learning on List 1, the groups were equivalent and the 
appropriate comparisons could be made. She reported that 
groups who had learned List 1 under self-paced conditions 
learned List 2 faster than subjects who had learned List 1 
under experimenter-paced conditions. This suggests that 
subjects who were allowed to control their study time 
acquired skills which other subjects did not. Furthermore, 
the beneficial effects of learning List l under self-paced 
conditions were apparent even though second list learning 
was experimenter paced. 
Since the assumption was made above that the process 
of self-pacing of study· items is related to implicit JKs, 
these latter findings concerning positive transfer suggest 
an interesting question: can the performance of implicit 
JKs be similarly regarded as a "skill" which could facilitate 
learning in subsequent tasks? That is, could successful 
learning based on correct implicit JKs be one of the many 
skills associated with learning-to-learn (cf. Postman, 
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1969)? The relationship between JKs and learning-to-learn 
is important for the present discussion. 
Information which contributes to a JK. Several sources 
of information which aid the subject in making a JK can be 
suggested. One obvious source is item characteristics. 
For example, if a subject were shown a list of high-fre-
quency words and a list of low-frequency words and was 
asked which would be easier to learn, he would probably 
select the high-frequency list. Through experience, cer-
tain item characteristics have become associated with 
"ease" or "difficulty" of learning. In a JK task, stim-
ulus knowledge, or a knowledge of item characteristics, 
will likely influence the subject's judgment. Although, 
it must be pointed out that JKs need not depend on stim-
ulus characteristics. If an item is learned sufficiently, 
that item's background frequency should not~ se affect 
a JK. 
The understanding of task demands may also influence 
a JK. If the above example were changed such that the 
subject were asked which list was easier to recognize, he 
should give the opposite response since it has been shown 
that low-frequency words are more easily recognized than 
high-frequency words (Underwood & Freund, 1970). An 
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understanding of task demands in general, or how item char-
acteristics can interact with task demands, will be called 
process knowledge. Thus in a JK task, an awareness of how 
the material will be tested may affect the JK response. 
Other examples of process knowledge would include an under-
standing of retro- and pro-active interference. That is, 
if a to-be-judged item was very similar to one studied in 
a previous list, the JK may be influenced if the subject 
has some understanding of proactive interference. 
A JK may also be influenced by implicit retrieval 
attempts. For example, during paired-associate learning, 
the subject may try to retrieve the mediator he had em-
ployed for that item before making his JK rating. If the 
task involved JKs after reading textual material, the sub-
ject may attempt to retrieve the "gist" of the sentences 
or paragraphs, and the success of these implicit retrieval 
attempts may affect the JK response.' 
Therefore, three major sources of information for a 
JK are: (a) stimulus knowledge, (b) process knowledge, 
and (c) implicit retrieval. The importance of each of 
these sources is likely to vary from task to task. For 
example, if homogeneous lists are used, differences in 
item characteristics would be minimal, and perhaps, proc-
ess knowledge would be a major determinant of the JK re-
sponse. However, it is suggested that across a variety 
of laboratory tasks, the validity of these sources of in-
formation may be demonstrated. 
Stimulus Knowledge 
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Subjects apparently know what characteristics of a 
stimulus are important in determining learning ease. Many 
types of items (words, nonsense syllables, consonant sylla-
bles) have been scaled for meaningfulness or association 
value. Richardson and Erlebacher (1958) examined the re-
lationship between rated ease of learning and degree of 
associative connection between pairs of verbal items. 
Subjects were given a sample paired-associate list fol-
lowed by a list of pairs of adjectives, nonsense syllables, 
or consonant syllables. Some subjects were asked to imag-
ine that each pair were inserted in the sample list and 
then to rate the ease-of-learning each for pair as if it 
were a member of the sample list. Other subjects were 
asked to rate the associative connection between members 
of the pairs as compared to pairs in the sample list. 
Very high correlations between rated ease-of-learning (EL) 
and meaningfulness of the pairs were obtained. 
In a more extensive analysis, Underwood (1966) demon-
strated that subjects are capable of accurately judging 
the ease or difficulty of an item prior to actual learning 
of the item. He first instructed subjects to imagine that 
they were in a free-recall experiment and then presented a 
list of trigrams. Subjects were to make judgments of the 
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speed with which they thought they would learn ~ach item in 
the imagined task. Following this, an incidental recall 
trail was given and then six actual study-test learning 
trials. Other groups of subjects simply learned the items 
or made pronunciability or meaningfulness ratings for the 
items. 
Underwood correlated the ease-of-learning judgments 
with a measure of item recall. The results of the Under-
wood study and some of the problems identified with this 
type of research are relevant to the present discussion. 
Mean EL ratings obtained from the group of subjects 
correlated highly (.96) with the mean number of times each 
item was correctly recalled across the six learning trials. 
However, one source of criticism of this correlational 
technique is that the requirement of EL judgments could 
produce a "bias." That is, subjects might have produced 
recall protocols which "matched" the ratings. An item 
judged as difficult before learning might have been treated 
differently during learning simply because it had received 
a "difficult" rating. Nevertheless, Underwood showed that 
the correlation between EL and learning measures taken 
from the same group was not higher than that obtained when 
EL ratings from one group were correlated with the learning 
scores of a group that did not make EL ratings. Thus, one 
can conclude that the relationship between EL and recall 
was reliable. 
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An additional concern of the Underwood study was wheth-
er an individual subject's EL ratings would predict his own 
learning. The correlation between an item's EL rating and 
the number of correct recalls across six learning trials 
was computed for each subject. The mean of the individual 
correlations was .48. Thus, subjects were able to predict 
their own learning of the trigrams with a substantial de-
gree of accuracy. However, these correlations were sub-
stantially lower than the correlations between group EL 
and group learning. Also, Underwood reported that group 
EL scale values predicted group learning better than in-
dividual subject's EL ratings predicted group learning. 
The difference in the relationships between individ-
ual ratings and learning and group EL ratings and learning 
suggests that across a group of subjects, a greater number 
of item characteristics which determine learning ease of 
difficulty are likely to be taken into account. This sug-
gests that an EL value is more valid if it represents a 
summation of perceived characteristics which determine 
learning ease across a group of individuals (for example, 
EL values could be seen as analogous to an item's associa-
tion value which is usually determined by a group of sub-
jects). Underwood suggested that the reliability of an 
individual's ratings should be examined. Since, in Under-
wood's experiment, individual EL-learning correlations 
were determined on the basis of one observation which was 
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subject to error of measurement; the individual ·correlations 
may approach the magnitude of the group correlation if sev-
eral EL ratings were made for each item. 
It is also possible that an EL rating may contain id-
iosyncratic factors. That is, a subject may judge an item 
as easy to learn because of some idiosyncratic association 
or because of some personal familiarity with an item. In 
order to test this, Underwood, randomly repaired each sub-
ject's EL ratings with another subject's recall scores. 
With this repairing, the EL-learning correlations tended 
to decrease, and this is exactly what one would expect if 
the EL scale was, in fact, reflecting a specific individ-
ual's perception of an item. 
In Underwood's analysis, individual differences in 
learning may also have affected the correlations. That 
is, for rapid learners a greater number of items would be 
recalled on all six trials, and a low correlation would 
result because of the attenuation in the range of possible 
learning scores. Underwood, therefore, ordered the sub-
jects into six groups according to learning ability. As 
learning ability increased the mean correlations tended 
to decrease. This finding could suggest that fast learners 
were simply poor raters of EL. However, this is unlikely 
since for the fast learners, EL ratings correlated highly 
with the group recall scores. Therefore, it must be con-
cluded that the decline in the correlations for the fast 
learners resulted from a statistical rather than· a con-
ceptual problem. 
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One additional concern with the Underwood experiment 
is that artificially high correlations could have resulted 
because of the wide range of item types employed. The 
study list contained both high-meaningful three-letter 
words and low-meaningful consonant-consonant-consonant 
trigrams. Such a "mixed" list may have artifically drawn 
attention to item characteristics that are related to 
learning ease. Nevertheless, Lippman and Kintz (1968) 
replicated Underwood's findings even though a more homo-
geneous list of items was used (all eve trigrams). 
The important conclusion from the research cited 
above is that even before specific instructions to learn 
the items, subjects can accurately "predict" their learn-
ing of these items. It is assumed that this is done by 
attending to those item characteristics which determine 
learning ease. Stimulus knowledge is likely to be ac-
quired through learning experience with a variety of 
items. The assumption that stimulus knowledge is acquired 
through learning tasks suggests a close relationship be-
tween stimulus knowledge and process knowledge. This re-
lationship will be considered in the next section. 
Process Knowledge 
A second general source of information that is avail-
able for the performance of a JK can be called process 
knowledge. This term is meant to refer to a general un-
derstanding of the "laws" of learning and a knowledge of 
specific task demands. For example, a student, upon be-
ing told of a forthcoming examination, will invariably 
17 
ask whether the test will be an essay test or a multiple-
choice test. This implies that the type of test will de-
termine how the student studies for the exam. The student 
appears to have an implicit understanding of the difference 
between a recall test and a recognition test. A JK may 
depend on the expected manner of testing. Similarly, stu-
dents may decide whether or not they have adequately pre-
pared for a test on the basis of how successful certain 
study habits have been in the past. A student who has 
always read the textbook three times and outlined the 
material before a test and who has been consistently re-
inforced with acceptable grades, is likely to say, "I 
read the material three times therefore I know it well 
enough to do well on the exam." Through experience, 
individuals develop general learning skills or study 
habits which can be applied to a variety of learning 
situations. 
Development of Process Knowledge--Metamemory. The 
development of process knowledge actually begins with an 
understanding of what "remember" means. Flavell (1971) 
and Hagen (1971) have noted that very young children may 
equate remembering with repetition and that processes 
such as meditation or rehearsal are not performed effec-
tively by young children. 
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In addition to the development of memory performance, 
the development of knowledge about one's memory has re-
cently been investigated by Flavell and his associates 
(Flavell & Wellman, in press). This knowledge about mem-
ory has been termed "metamemory." Kruetzer, Leonard, and 
Flavell (1975) interviewed young children to access the 
degree to which they understood their own memory capabil-
ities. Children were asked, for example, "Suppose you 
looked up your friend's telephone number. If your brother 
asked you a question just before you begin to dial, do you 
think you would be able to remember the number?" Answers 
to this question suggested that children possess an implic-
it understanding of the concept of interference in immed-
iate memory. From this and similar questions, the authors 
concluded that children show clear evidence of comprehend-
ing basic "laws" of human memory. 
The understanding of immediate memory span was specif-
ically tested by Flavell, Fredricks, and Hoyt (1970). Nur-
sery school, kindergarten, second- and fourth-grade chil-
dren were asked to predict their own memory span. They 
were shown a series of pictures of increasing lengths, and 
the maximum number of items the children thought they could 
remember was recorded. When these predictions were compared 
with actual recall, it was found that, while all children 
tended to overestimate their memory capacity, th~ degree 
of overprediction dropped with age. 
Yussen and Levy (1975) pointed to a possible method-
ological flaw in the Flavell et al. study and extended 
19 
the investigation to include adult subjects. Yussen and 
Levy questioned the use of two demonstration trials (lengths 
of one and two items) on which nearly all Flavell's subjects 
were successful. These trials could have led to an unwar-
ranted expectancy for success. To control for this bias, 
they presented stimulus arrays in decreasing as well as 
increasing order of difficulty. Furthermore, normative 
information was given to the subjects. That is, they were 
told "your friends can remember this many," when the ser-
ies of appropriate length was presented. For all subjects 
(ages 4, 8, and 20 years) the tendency to over-predict was 
observed, but accuracy of prediction for all but the young-
est subjects increased when normative information was given. 
Apparently, 4 year olds were uninfluenced by knowledge of 
their peer group's performance. It is interesting to note 
that adults were quite accurate in predicting their immed-
iate memory span. The mean predicted recall was 5.83 items, 
and the mean actual recall was 5.52 items. 
In addition to an understanding of one's general mem-
ory capacity, the awareness of certain "rules" of memory 
performance is important in the development of process 
knowledge. Moynahan (1973) examined first-, second- and 
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third-graders' awareness of the ease of recalling concep-
tually related items as opposed to unrelated items. Sub-
jects were shown two cards, one containing eight unrelated 
items and one containing eight categorized items (four in-
stances of two categories). Subjects were then asked to 
select that card which would be easier to remember. First-
graders were less likely to select the categorized card 
than were third- or fifth-graders, yet the first-graders 
selected the categorized card more often than would be 
expected by chance. Thus, even first-graders showed some 
understanding of the facilitory effects of categorization 
on recall. 
In an earlier part of this paper, the differential 
apportionment of study time to items within a list was 
assumed to be related to the JK process (cf. Zacks, 1969). 
Masur, Mcintyre, and Flavell (1973) extended Zack's find-
ings to include first- and third-graders as well as col-
lege-age subjects. The task was to learn a list of items 
which was 50% longer than each subject's memory span. Af-
ter presentation of the list for 45 seconds, recall was 
tested. On subsequent trials, each subject was told that 
he could study only one half of the items and he was to 
indicate which items he wanted to study. However, as the 
subject's learning approached criterion (one perfect reci-
tation) new items were added to the list prior to the sub-
ject's selection of study items. 
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In order to determine if the selection of study items 
was affected by the success of previous recall attempts, 
the proportion of items not recalled on the previous trial 
that were selected for 'study was computed for each subject. 
The proportions for first-graders were significantly less 
than for the other groups of subjects. In post-experimen-
tal interviews, none of the first-graders reported con-
scious selection of previously missed items. It was not 
likely that first-graders failed to understand the task 
since they, like the older subjects, tended to select 
"new" items which were added to the study list on the 
final trials. Furthermore, it was unlikely that first-
graders failed to remember what they had recalled on pre-
vious attempts. Masur et al. retested eight subjects, 
and before study trials began, they asked subjects to 
indicate which items they had just recalled. Subjects 
were extremely accurate at this recognition task. The 
authors suggested that while the adults might have tried 
to remember all the items, younger subjects might have 
spent most of their effort on remembering those items 
which had been selected for study. Thus for the younger 
students, the strategy of allocating additional study 
time to unlearned items would not have been appropriate 
for the task as they perceived it. Masur et al. conclud-
ed that this strategy was probably absent from the young 
children's repertoire of study behaviors. 
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From the above research, two general conclusions re-
garding the development of process knowledge can be stated. 
First, even young children exhibit an awareness of the gen-
eral "laws" of memory and are aware of the capacities of 
their memories. Secondly, metamemory and memory perform-
ance seem to develop in parallel. This suggests a rather 
strong relationship between process knowledge and learning 
ability. 
Process knowledge: knowledge of task demands. A sub-
ject who differentially encodes verbal material on the ba-
sis of the type of test he expects is exhibiting process 
knowledge. Gude and Zechmeister (Note 2) reported that 
subjects anticipating a recognition test showed poorer 
recall than subjects expecting a recall test. They sug-
gested that this effect was due to the reduced level of 
attention subjects found necessary to produce efficient 
performance on a previous recognitirin task. 
Kellas, McCaully and McFarland (1975) also demon-
strated that subjects employ task-specific skills during 
encoding. Subjects were given successive 15-item lists 
for either serial learning or free recall learning. Pre-
sentation was self-paced and thus the distribution of 
study times for serial and free recall learning could be 
examined. Under serial learning instructions, a direct 
linear relationship between study-time and serial posi-
tion was observed. This suggests that rehearsal of items 
was cumulative. For free-recall, this relationship was 
less systematic. This difference suggests that the per-
ception of task demands led to different encoding behav-
ior. 
It can be suggested that the subject's perception 
of the appropriateness of the encoding of an item might 
influence his JK response. This would require process 
knowledge. 
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Process knowledge--"Mis-judgments" of knowing. Er-
roneously perceived task demands can lead to what may be 
called implicit "misjudgments" of knowing. As was dis-
cussed above, Zechmeister and Shaughnessy (Note 1) sug-
gested that the spacing effect could be related to the 
subject's mis-perception of task demands. The attention-
al explanation of the spacing effect is somewhat depen-
dent on the subject's misjudgment of what is necessary 
for successful retention of massed items. 
It is likely that other memory phenomena can be ex-
plained on the basis of erroneous implicit JKs. Craik 
(1970) and McCabe and Madigan (1970) have reported that 
if a subject is presented with a series of short free 
recall lists, terminal items will be recalled almost per-
fectly on an immediate test, but on a delayed final test 
given after the series of short lists, these terminal 
items will be recalled very poorly. This recall decre-
ment has been called the "negative recency effect." 
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Light (1974) encouraged subjects to increase rehearsal of 
terminal items and informed subjects. that they would be 
given a final test. Even with this clarification of task 
demands, the negative recency effect was still obtained. 
She suggested that terminal items were rehearsed in a dif-
ferent manner than other items. That is, terminal items 
were rehearsed in a manner that merely maintained the 
items, whereas other list items were given more "elaborate" 
rehearsals (cf. Craik, 1973). Thus subjects were misjudg-
ing what was necessary to assure retention of terminal 
items. Watkins and Watkins (1974) found that when sub-
jects were given a series of lists of varying lengths, 
and thus could not know when the end of the list was 
approaching, the negative recency effect vanished. There-
fore, under these conditions, it can be assumed that sub-
jects did not treat terminal items differentially. The 
subjects were "prevented" from making a misjudgment of 
knowing at the time of encoding, and this apparently in-
creased retention. 
These examples suggest that with learning experience, 
it is likely that "inappropriate" as well as appropriate 
learning strategies can be acquired. Therefore, part of 
what is called process knowledge is the knowledge of the 
relationship between task demands and appropriate encoding 
processes. 
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Implicit Retrieval 
In addition to stimulus knowledge and process knowl-
edge, a JK may also depend on a direct examination of the 
contents of memory, that is, implicit retrieval. Accord-
ing to the definition of JKs stated earlier in this paper, 
a JK response is made during the study phase of a learning 
task. Therefore, a pre-test phase retrieval attempt is 
assumed to be made without the benefit of explicit retriev-
al attempts (or test trials). 
An obvious way to decide if you are going to be able 
to remember certain information at a later time is to try 
to retrieve that information. If this attempt is success-
ful, attention may be directed to less well-established 
information. For example, if a JK is required during 
paired-associate learning, the subject may attempt to 
retrieve the mediator he had employed for that pair on 
earlier trials. In free recall, the subject may review 
associative connections between list items or rehearse 
retrieval strategies when making a JK. If these retrieval 
attempts are successful, the subject may rate an item as 
likely to be remembered. 
However, it must be noted that a delayed test may 
render information gained from an implicit retrieval at-
tempt invalid. That is, in paired-associate learning, a 
subject may successfully retrieve the mediator for a list 
pair and make a JK response. However, during the retention 
. ' 
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interval, forgetting of the mediator may be just as likely 
as forgetting of the response term. · Thus the JK would 
become less reliable if no other relevant sources of in-
formation were available to the subject. 
As was mentioned earlier, a JK may be seen as a self-
regulatory process. The assumed purpose of a JK is to 
allow processing time to be allocated in the most efficient 
manner. That is, distinguishing between "known" and "un-
known" material will allow extra attention to be given to 
unknown material. Furthermore, it must be pointed out 
that the JK response for an item may be made relative to 
the degree to which other to-be-learned material is suc-
cessful encoded. Thus it is possible that during an im-
plicit retrieval attempt, complete retrieval of informa-
tion may indicate to the subject that the material is 
well-established and that further processing would be un-
necessary. However, a partially successful retrieval at-
tempt may indicate the degree to which further processing 
is necessary. A partially successful retrieval attempt 
tells the subject that information is not completely ab-
sent from memory and that with additional study time, 
that information may easily become well-established. 
Therefore, information gained from partial retrieval 
may be helpful to the subject who is making a JK response. 
Two rather common memory phenomena which have been related 
to partial retrieval will now be considered. 
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Relationship between JK and Tip-of-the-Tongue Phe-
nomena. The tip-of-the-tongue (TOT). phenomenon was empir-
ically demonstrated by Brown and McNeil! (1966). Subjects 
were presented with the definition of an uncommon English 
word and were then asked to supply the word. If the sub-
ject could not recall the word but indicated a TOT state, 
he was asked what he knew about the target word. If an 
items was not retrieved, information such as the first 
letter, number of syllables, letters in various positions, 
syllabic stress, and suffixes could often be accurately 
reported. It appeared as though the greater the number 
of attributes recalled, the greater the likelihood of 
eventual successful retrieval of the target word. 
Koriat and Lieblich (1974) improved the analysis of 
TOT states by accounting for guessing rates. For example, 
if you are searching for the name of a chemical element, 
you are more likely to report that the target word has 
four syllables than one syllable based on your general 
knowledge of chemical terminology. This more analytic 
approach led them to suggest that both knowledge about 
the class of items to which the target word belongs (class 
detection) and the retrieval of information specific to 
the target word (differential detection) can result in a 
TOT experience. 
Recently Yarmey (1974) studied the TOT phenomenon in 
relation to non-verbal information. Subjects were shown 
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pictures of famous people and were required to supply 
their names. In a manner similar to the Brown and McNeill 
study, subjects reporting a TOT state were asked to indi-
cate the occupation of .the target person, the places where 
the target person would most often be seen, and how re-
cently the target person had been encountered. Orthograph-
ic and phonetic information about the target person's name 
was also requested. Yarmey found that initial letters, 
number of syllables, and sound of the target name were not 
as frequently supplied as were reports of the target per-
son's profession, or the place or time of recent encounter 
with the person. Thus while Brown and McNeil demonstrated 
that subjects in a TOT state could accurately report verbal 
information, Yarmey showed that spatial-temporal or non-
verbal information may also be retrieved in a TOT situa-
tion. 
A very similar memory phenomenon, called the "Feeling-
of-Knowing" experience (FK), occurs when one reports that 
unrecallable information is recognizable. Hart (1965, 
1966, 1967) has extensively analyzed this phenomenon, and 
since the methods and analyzes he employed are similar to 
those which will be employed in the present experiment, 
these studies will be considered in detail. 
Hart exploited the well-established fact that recog-
nition is generally better than recall. The general pro-
cedure was as follows. Subjects were given general 
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information questions that had only a single ans~er. For 
each question that could not be answered, subjects were 
told to make a yes-no judgment as to whether the correct 
answer could be selected from several alternatives. Fol-
lowing completion of this task, multiple-alternative 
recognition tests were given. The technique has been 
called the recall-judgment-recognition (RJR) paradigm. 
An accurate FK judgment could represent one of two 
cases. When a subject said he knew the answer (YES judg-
ment) and, in fact, he could select it from the alterna-
tives on the recognition test, the response was called 
a FK hit.. Likewise, when the subject reported that he 
could not recognize the answer (NO judgment) and, in 
fact, could not select the correct alternative on the 
recognition test, the response was called a Feeling-of-
NOT-knowing hit (FK hit). A FK miss and a FK miss rep-
resent instances in which the judgments did not match 
the subsequent recognition performance. To test the 
accuracy of FK judgments, recognition of items the sub-
ject "felt he knew" should be compared with recognition 
of items the subject "felt he did not know"; that is, 
FK hits versus FK misses. 
Hart (1965) found that more non-recalled items given 
a YES FK rating were recognized than items given a NO FK 
rating. While this indicated that accurate judgments can 
be made about what is in storage, judgments of what is 
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not in memory were found to be less accurate than would 
be expected. It was found that 43% of the items subjects 
judged as not in memory were nevertheless subsequently 
correctly recognized. ·Hart (1966) reduced this FK miss 
rate by providing more equally-likely alternatives on the 
recognition test and by including a six-point rating scale 
rather than the yes-no dichotomy for FK judgments. The FK 
miss rates was reduced but did not vanish under these more 
sensitive conditions. 
Hart (1966) also improved the RJR technique by re-
quiring subjects to guess on every recall attempt, since 
subjects who withheld retrieved information could have 
effectively inflated the FK accuracy scores. That is, if 
a subject remembered that he had earlier judged an item 
to be unknown, he could increase the accuracy of his FK 
responses by simply withholding the correct response (in 
this case, the FK miss rate would remain low, thereby 
increasing the difference between FK hits and FK misses). 
The guessing requirement tended to reduce the relative 
magnitude of FK hits to PK misses; however, Hart concluded 
that the FK experience was still demonstrated. 
In a later experiment, Hart (1967) employed the RJR 
paradigm with word-trigram paired-associates. After one, 
two, or three study trials, a recall test was presented. 
A response was demanded for each stimulus on the test 
list, and if the subject believed he was responding 
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correctly, he was to circle the response. For ill uncir-
cled items, the subject was to make a FK judgment. Three 
learning trials produced a greater difference between FK 
hits and FK misses than did one or two trials. (Both FK 
' hits and FK misses increased as the number of study trials 
increased, but the former increased at a faster rate than 
the latter.) 
Perhaps a weakness in Hart's research concerns the 
problem of criterion differences across subjects. That 
is, some subjects may be more cautious in predicting later 
recognition than others, and given some method of measuring 
criterion, the accuracy of FK judgments might be shown to 
increase. (See Murdock, 1966, for a discussion of criter-
ion problems in memory tasks.) 
In general, it is important to consider information 
available to the subject which tells him that to-be-learned 
material is not yet learned. This information can be seen 
as just as important to the subject as is information which 
leads him to believe that the material is already learned. 
Therefore, under certain conditions, the TOT experience 
and the FK experience could be related to the performance 
of a JK. 
JKs and Learning to Learn 
As was mentioned earlier in this paper, the capacity 
to make JKs is related to the notion of learning-to-learn 
in that JKs may represent a skill which can be applied 
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across a variety of learning situations. The present ex-
periment is directly aimed at the question of JKs as a 
learnable skill. 
In research in human learning, transfer effects have 
been traditionally divided into two classes: specific 
and non-specific transfer. The present experimenter deals 
with one aspect of so-called non-specific transfer, learn-
ing to learn. Non-specific transfer effects are assumed 
to be independent of any purposeful similarity of the 
to-be-learned material across a series of tasks. Specific 
transfer effects, on the other hand, are traditionally 
seen as dependent on planned relationships between items 
on successive lists to be learned. 
The above classification of transfer effects has re-
cently been challenged. In an extensive analysis of 
learning-to-learn, Postman (1969) has presented the view 
that no clear discontinuity between specific and non-spe-
cific transfer can be postulated. That is, types of trans-
fer are seen as lying along a continuum of applicability. 
Transfer represents a "carrying over" of an acquired habit 
or skill from the learning of one list to the learning of 
another. Some skills are more generally applicable than 
others. 
The effects of learning-to-learn can be demonstrated 
by the learning of two lists which reflect no systematic 
relationship or similarity between 
r 
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the two lists (e.g., A-B, C-D). During learning of the 
first list, response integration skills (among others) 
may be acquired which facilitate learning of the second 
list. For example, if. List 1 contains low-meaningful 
trigrams as response terms, then learning experience with 
these items will facilitate second list learning to a 
greater extent than if List 1 was comprised of readily 
available high meaningful words (Postman, Keppel & Zacks, 
1968). A skill was acquired. This skill was the effi-
cient processing of low-meaningful items. 
Othe~ conditions of paired-associate learning may 
lead to the acquisition of higher order "rules" for learn-
ing lists of a specific structure. Postman (1969) suggests 
that rules of inclusion and exclusion are employed to dis-
criminate between correct and incorrect responses. For 
example, in the specific transfer paradigm, A-B, C-B, 
response terms are identical on the two successive lists, 
but the stimuli differ. This paradigm requires the use 
of the rule of inclusion, or the use of "old" response 
terms. Furthermore, the use of these rules can be learned 
across a series of pairs of lists. That is, employment 
of the rules can result from learning-to-learn (Postman, 
1964). 
Postman (1969) concludes that such skills as response 
integration, method of practice (serial vs. paired asso-
ciate learning), and higher order rules of response 
selection may be included under the classificatibn of 
learning-to-learn. 
LaPorte and Voss (1974a) furthered the analysis of 
learning-to-learn effects by independently manipulating 
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(1) the number of lists learned before the critical trans-
fer list, and (2) the criterion of learning each list. 
Thus, the number of associations to be learned could be 
held constant while the criterion differed. Learning four 
eight-item lists to a 50% criterion requires the same num-
ber of associations as does the learning of two eight-item 
lists to a 100% criterion. Some of the results reported 
by LaPorte and Voss are especially relevant to the present 
discussion. They found that if a constant number of asso-
ciations were required for pre-critical list learning, 
positive non-specific transfer was more likely to result 
if the initial lists were learned to a 100% criterion than 
if the initial lists were learned to a 50% criterion. 
Thus it appeared that, in certain situations, one aspect 
of positive transfer is the ability to process unlearned 
pairs when part of the list has already been learned. A 
"mastery" of the list requires the subject to discriminate 
the pairs that have been learned from the pairs that have 
not been learned and then to allocate processing efforts 
accordingly. 
In a related study of paired-associate learning, 
LaPorte and Voss (1974b) substituted a computational 
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filler task in place of test trials. Groups were given 5, 
10, 20, or 40 such non-test trials and then were required 
to learn the list under normal study-test conditions to a 
criterion of one perfett trial. A control group was given 
only the normal study-test learning trials. Performance 
of the first test trial by the groups who received no 
initial test trials was compared to the number of study-
test trials which was necessary for the control group to 
reach an equal degree of learning. The control group re-
quired about half as many trials to reach the level of 
performance of the groups who were not previously tested. 
The authors concluded that in the testing conditions, 
valuable "feedback" information was available to the sub-
ject. This feedback allows the subjects to determine 
which pairs are learned and which pairs require further 
processing. If testing were absent, it would become more 
difficult for subjects to discriminate between known and 
unknown pairs. Also, when test trials are removed, the 
subjects' rehearsal may be unrelated to the degree to 
which an item is successfully stored in memory. LaPorte, 
Voss, and Bisanz (1974) attempted to extend these findings 
to a transfer paradigm. However, no evidence was obtained 
which suggested that elimination of test trials during the 
learning of List 1 produced a detriment in the second list 
learning. In the present experiment, the role of test 
trials in the JK process will be examined. 
THE PRESENT EXPERIMENT 
The present experiment was designed to answer the 
following questions. First, under paired-associate (PA) 
learning conditions, to what extent do JKs depend on 
knowledge of previous test trial performance? Second, 
does JK accuracy improve as familiarity with specific 
task demands increases? Third, does JK experience lead 
to the development of learning "skills" which can be em-
ployed when conditions of learning change? 
A learning-to-learn paradigm was employed. Four 
groups of subjects learned three different PA lists, and 
t\·:o critical aspects of the learning procedure comprised 
the independent variables. 
Differences in the learning procedure during the 
first two lists defined the first independent variable. 
One half the subjects learned the pairs under an alter-
nating study-test trial procedure (STUDY-TEST groups); 
while, for the other two groups, intervening test trials 
were omitted and a single test trial was given for each 
·list (STUDY-ONLY groups). On the third list, all sub-
jects learned the pairs under the STUDY-ONLY conditions. 
A second important aspect of the procedure involved 
the presence or absence of a JK rating trial after each 
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PA list. Two of the groups were shown the pairs· after 
learning and were asked to make JKs (JK groups). For the 
remaining two groups, no JKs were required for the first 
two lists, and subjects were given an additional study 
trial (CONTROL groups). For the third list (STUDY-ONLY), 
all subjects were asked to make JK ratings after learning 
and before the test trial. 
Therefore, four groups, representing a factorial com-
bination of the two independent variables (STUDY-TEST vs. 
STUDY-ONLY, and JK vs. CONTROL) were employed. These 
groups will be referred to as STUDY-TEST-JK, STUDY-TEST-
CONTROL, STUDY-ONLY-JK, and STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL. A diagram 
of the procedure is contained in Table 1. Both the im-
provement in JK accuracy across the first two lists and 
the level of accuracy on the third list were of interest. 
Regarding the major purposes of the present experi-
ment, the following hypotheses can be stated. 
First, since subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK group 
will have knowledge of test trial performance available 
to them while the subjects in the STUDY-ONLY-JK group 
will not, JK accuracy will be greater for the former 
group than for the latter group on the first list. 
Second, since subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK and 
STUDY-ONLY-JK groups will gain experience with task 
demands across the first two lists, both these groups 
will show improvement in JK accuracy. Since the 
A. 
B. 
c. 
D. 
Table 1 
Schematic Diagram of the Procedure 
Group Lists 1 & 2 
STUDY-TEST-JK S-T, S-T, S-T 
STUDY-ONLY-JK S, S, -S, S, S 
STUDY-TEST-CONTROL S-T, S-T, S-T 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL S, S, S, S, S 
S-T - PA study and test trial 
S - study trial only 
JK - Judgment of Knowing trial 
JK 
JK 
s 
s 
TEST 
TEST 
TEST 
TEST 
List 3 
s' s' s JK 
s' s' s JK 
s' s' s JK 
s' s' s JK 
TEST 
TEST 
TEST 
TEST 
VI 
co 
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STUDY-TEST-JK group should have more information· relevant 
to a JK available, this group should improve at a faster 
rate than the STUDY-ONLY-JK group across the first two 
lists. 
Third, the STUDY-TEST-JK group should show a decrease 
in JK accuracy on List 3 when intervening test trials are 
removed. That is, for this group, conditions of learning 
were changed such that knowledge of test trial performance 
would not be available. If this information was crucial 
for the STUDY-TEST-JK group's JK performance on the first 
two lists, then JKs should be less accurate on List 3. 
The fourth hypothesis states that subjects in the 
STUDY-ONLY-JK group will exhibit continued improvement in 
JK accuracy across all three lists. This would indicate 
that subjects learned to make JKs on knowledge other than 
that provided by test trials. 
The fifth hypothesis concerns JK accuracy on the third 
list. The STUDY-TEST-JK group will show greater JK accura-
cy than the STUDY-TEST-CONTROL group since the f0rmer group 
will have had experience with the JK task while the latter 
group will not have had this experience. Similarly, the 
STUDY-ONLY-JK group will show greater JK accuracy than the 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL group on the third list. 
A secondary issue which was investigated concerned the 
effect on recall of making JKs. That is, does the require-
ment of making JKs lead the subject to more efficient 
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processing than when no JK requirement is present and the 
subject is left to his own devices? Within the STUDY-TEST 
groups, it is expected that those subjects making JKs will 
recall more items than· those subjects not making JKs. Sim-
ilarly for the STUDY-ONLY groups, the STUDY-ONLY-JK group 
will show greater recall than the STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL group. 
METHOD 
Design. Four groups of subjects learned three lists 
of 24 PAs. Two groups learned the first two lists under 
an alternating study-test trial procedure (STUDY-TEST 
groups). The other two groups learned the first two lists 
with no test trials intervening between study trials and 
only a single test trial following several study trials 
(STUDY-ONLY groups). Within the STUDY-TEST groups, one 
group was asked to make JK ratings before the last test 
trial (STUDY-TEST-JK). The other STUDY-TEST group re-
ceived an additional study trial in place of the JK rating 
trial (STUDY-TEST-CONTROL). Similarly for the STUDY-ONLY 
groups, one group received a JK trial before the single 
test trial (STUDY-ONLY-JK), while the other group re-
ceived an additional study trial (STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL). 
For the third list, all groups learned under the STUDY-
ONLY conditions, and all groups made JK ratings before 
the single test trial. Therefore, the four groups were 
distinguished by the learning procedure and by the pres-
· ence or absence of the JK rating trial on each of the 
first two lists. 
Materials. Three 24-item lists of PAs were con-
structed. From the Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan (1968) 
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norms, all two-syllable words were selected with frequen-
cies between 1 and 50 per million (Thorndike & Lorge, 1944). 
The words in this pool were ranked on imagery value, and 
the 72 items with the lowest imagery values were selected 
for use as response terms; These items were randomly di-
vided into three sets of 24. Stimulus terms were 72 eve 
trigrams randomly selected from Noble's (1961) norms. 
Stimuli ranged in association value from 70% to 78%. 
From the pool of 72 eves, items were randomly divided 
into three sets of 24 items with the qualification that, 
within an item set, no two trigrams could have the first 
two letters in common. Stimulus and response item sets 
were paired, and the 24 eves and two-syllable words with-
in a set were randomly paired to form three lists of 24 
PAs. Stimulus-response pairs were typed on index cards 
for study trial presentation. 
In order to prevent serial position from serving as 
a cue in PA learning, on each study trial, subjects re-
ceived a different order of study items. To construct 
different orders, each of the three study lists was con-
sidered as four blocks of six items. Items within a block 
were randomly rearranged on each trial. Also, the order 
of the blocks was random on each trial. Furthermore, the 
order of item presentation for rating and test trials was 
different than that for study trials. 
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Study, rating, and test lists were constructed such 
that the interval between studying and rating an item and 
the interval between rating and testing an item would be 
controlled. For this teason, all lists were divided into 
blocks of items, and membership in a block was systemati-
cally controlled. Study lists were arranged into four 
blocks of six items. Rating lists included six blocks 
of four items, and each block was composed of one item 
randomly selected from each of the four study list blocks. 
Using this procedure, two different orders of list items 
were constructed to be used for JK ratings for each item 
set. Test lists were also divided into four blocks of 
six items. Each test block contained one item randomly 
selected from each rating list block. Subjects in the 
STUDY-TEST groups received several test trials over each 
item set, and in order to prevent repeated exposure to 
the same order of test items, three different orders of 
test items were constructed using the same procedure. 
The rating and test lists were printed on half sheets 
of paper and inserted in envelopes such that only one item 
could be exposed at a time. 
Pilot Study. A pilot study was conducted in order to 
determine the necessary number of learning trials to reach 
a criterion of approximately 50% for each of the conditions 
of the present experiment. Using the same materials as de-
scribed above, subjects in one pilot group were required 
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to learn the PAs under STUDY-TEST conditions, and subjects 
in a second pilot group learned the PAs under STUDY-ONLY 
instructions. A 50% criterion was attained after three 
trials for the STUDY-TEST pilot group and after five trials 
for the STUDY-ONLY pilot group. Items were presented at a 
3 second rate. Hence, these parameters were used in the 
present experiment. 
JK Task. A JK is defined as the subjectively rated 
likelihood of later retention of presently studied infor-
mation. Accuracy of the prediction is determined by even-
tual recall or non-recall of the rated item. To insure 
the validity of the JK, it is necessary to prevent subjects 
from withholding responses. That is, if a subject remem-
bered at the time of test that he had not predicted recall 
for that particular item, he/she might withhold the response 
in order to achieve correct prediction. To prevent this, 
a game devised by Pasko (Note 3) was employed, and game 
points were administered on the basis of correct recall 
and use of the JK scale. 
A six point scale was provided for the JK rating. 
The scale was intended to be dichotomous and to reflect 
the degree of confidence in the prediction. Table 2 con-
tains the JK scale and the conditions under which points 
were assigned. Subjects were instructed that they would 
receive +5 points for every word they recalled and -5 
points for every word not recalled. Additional bonus or 
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Table 2 
Summary of the Rules For Receiving Points in the JK Task 
1 2 3 
No 
I will not 
recall the item. 
4 5 6 
Yes 
I will recall 
the item. 
1. For each response term recalled on the final trial 
you will get +5. 
2. For each response not recalled on the final trial 
you will get -5. 
3. If you recall an item, and you indicated a YES, 
4. 
(e.g. 4, 5, or 6) then you get bonus points. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
-3 -2 -1 +l +2 +3 
If you indicated on your JK that you would not re-
call the item (e.g. 1, 2' or 3) then you will lose 
points. 
If you do not recall an item you lose 5 points but 
you may gain some of the points back if your JK 
matched your recall. That is, if you said you 
would not recall an item, then you get bonus points. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
+3 +2 +l -1 -2 -3 
Note, however, that if you reported that you would 
recall the item, but you didn't, then in addition 
to losing 5 points for not recalling the item, you 
would be penalized an additional 1, 2, or 3 points. 
penalty points were to be assigned on the basis ·of the 
specific JK response. Briefly, subjects were told that 
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if their prediction matched their recall performance, they 
would receive bonus points corresponding to the degree to 
which they were sure that recall would or would not follow. 
Likewise, penalty points were determined by the extremeness 
of the JK response when it did not match recall performance. 
It should be noted that for an accurate prediction of not 
knowing (or non-recall), an item was rewarded by as many 
as +3 points but that -5 points were assigned for a missed 
item. Consequently, maximum game points could only be 
gained by recalling as many items as possible. 
Procedure. Subjects were seen in pairs and were 
assigned to groups by a blocked randomization procedure 
upon appearance at the laboratory. All subjects were told 
that they were to participate in a memory study and that 
their ability to predict what was known would be of impor-
tance. They were instructed that pairs of items (CVC-two-
syllable word pairs) would be presented and production of 
the two-syllable word would be required. They were told 
that they would be allowed to see the list several times; 
but they were not told that more than one PA list would 
be presented for learning. 
For the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLY-JK groups, the 
specific details of the JK task were explained before pre-
sentation of the first list. Cards displaying the JK 
r 
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scale and the game's payoff matrix (see Table 2) were 
placed in front of the subjects, and the specific rules 
were briefly explained. The concept of prediction was 
frequently mentioned throughout the JK task instructions. 
Since subjects in the two CONTROL groups did not make JKs 
until after presentation of the third list, these subjects 
were told that, later in the experiment, they would par-
ticipate in a game regarding their ability to predict 
what was known. 
For the learning of the first two lists, study decks 
were placed in front of the subject, and he/she was in-
structed to turn to the next card at the sound of a tone. 
Tape recorded tones occurred at a 3 second rate. Follow-
ing a study trial, subjects in the STUDY-TEST groups were 
given an envelope containing a test sheet and were told 
to pull the sheet out of the envelope to expose the next 
stimulus item whenever they heard a tone. Next to each 
stimulus term, they were to write down the response term. 
Subjects were encouraged to guess and were instructed to 
place an "X" next to those CVCs for which they could not 
produce a response. Tones during test trials occurred at 
a 5 second rate. Following three such study-test-trial 
cycles, subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK group were given 
an envelope containing the list of study pairs and a JK 
rating sheet. Tones occurring every 5 seconds paced the 
subjects through the JK list. Subjects wrote a scale 
value next to each pair as it was revealed. In ·place of 
the JK rating list, subjects in the STUDY-TEST-CONTROL 
group were given a study deck for an additional study 
trial. These subjects· were told that the list would be 
presented again at a slower rate, and for this trial, 
items were also presented at a S second rate. Then, for 
both STUDY-TEST groups, a last test trial was given. 
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Subjects in the STUDY-ONLY groups did not receive 
test trials following each study trial, and five study 
trials were presented. Items were shown at a 3 second 
rate. After the study trials, subjects in the STUDY-ONLY-
JK group were given the JK rating list followed by a re-
call test as described above for the STUDY-TEST-JK group. 
The STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL group received a sixth study trial 
before the test trial in place of the JK task. This pro-
cedure was followed for the first two lists. 
For the learning of the third list, all groups were 
told that the learning procedure would be slightly differ-
ent for the third list but that the same type of PAs would 
be presented. Subjects in the STUDY-TEST groups were told 
that now they would not be tested after each study trial 
but would receive only a single test. Subjects in the 
STUDY-ONLY groups were told that the procedure would be 
the same except that fewer learning trials would be allowed. 
For subjects in the CONTROL groups, the JK task instructions 
were presented at this time, and for all other subjects, 
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the instructions were reviewed. The interval bitween the 
end of List 2 and the beginning of List 3 presentation was 
approximately equal for all groups. Following these in-
structions, all subjects studied the third list for three 
study trials with no intervening study trials followed by 
a JK trial and a final test trial. 
The six possible orders of the three item sets were 
employed, and within a group, five subjects learned the 
item sets in each order. 
Subjects. Subjects were Loyola University undergrad-
uates participating to fulfill a course requirement. Thir-
ty subjects served in each group. Four subjects had to be 
replaced due to a failure to follow instructions. 
RESULTS 
Initial analyses were performed to determine whether 
differences in recall could be attributed to item sets or 
I 
rating-test forms. None of these F ratios reached signif-
icance, and, subsequently, these were not included as fac-
tors in any of the analyses of variance to be reported. 
The following terms were used to identify factors in 
the analyses of variance: study condition (i.e. STUDY-
TEST vs. STUDY-ONLY); JK experience (i.e. JK vs. CONTROL); 
and Lists (1, 2, & 3). 
Recall. Analyses were performed to determine if 
study condition and/or JK experience led to different 
levels of recall. Figure 1 displays the mean number of 
correctly recalled response terms for the three lists for 
each of the four groups. For the STUDY-TEST groups, these 
means are based on the last test trial; and for the STUDY-
ONLY groups, the means are based on the single test trial 
recall scores. The ANOVA source table is contained in 
Table 3. The main effect for study condition reached sig-
nificance, F (1,116) = 8.94, £ < .005. Although pilot 
·work had indicated that recall following three study-test 
trials was equivalent to that after five study-only trials, 
the STUDY-TEST groups recalled more items on each list 
so 
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than did the STUDY-ONLY groups. Furthermore, the main 
effect for lists was significant, F (2,232) = 49.35, £ < 
.001. As can be seen in Figure 1, more items were recalled 
on the second list than on the other two lists. The study 
condition by list interaction also reached significance, 
F (2,232) = 7.71, £ < .05. Examination of Figure 1 re-
veals that across the first two lists, the increase in 
recall for the STUDY-TEST and STUDY-ONLY groups was sim-
ilar. The decrease in recall between Lists 2 and 3 was 
slightly greater for the STUDY-TEST groups than for the 
STUDY-ONLY groups. As can also be seen in Figure 1, 
there was no main effect for JK experience, F < 1.0. 
Subjects making JKs did not recall more items than sub-
jects not making JKs on each list. Furthermore, there 
was no JK experience by list interaction, F < 1.0. 
Simple effects analyses were performed to determine 
if List 3 recall was affected by study condition and JK 
experience. Contrary to expectations, the STUDY-ONLY 
groups did not recall more items on List 3 than the 
STUDY-TEST groups, F < 1.0. Furthermore, the JK groups 
did not recall more items on List 3 than the CONTROL 
groups, F < 1.0. 
The unexpected difference in degree-of-learning 
between the STUDY-TEST and STUDY-ONLY groups might have 
been due to differences in recall criterion or willing-
ness to respond with a "guess." To test for recall 
t-
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a function of list. 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Variance Summary 
Source 
JK experience 
study condition 
JK by ST 
error (between) 
lists (L) 
L by JK 
L by ST 
L by JK by ST 
error (within) 
* E. < • 01 
** E. < .005 
*** E. < .001 
(ST) 
For Correct Recall 
SS df MS 
2.34 1 2.34 
621.47 1 621.47 
8.40 1 8.40 
8063.25 116 69.55 
718.11 2 359.05 
8.90 2 8.90 
112.21 2 56.10 
26.94 2 13.47 
1688.12 232 7.28 
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Table 
F 
<1. 0 
8.94 ** 
<1. 0 
49.35 *** 
<1. 0 
7.71 * 
1. 85 
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criterion differences, intra-list intrusions and extra-
list intrusions were tabulated for each subject. Also, 
the number of incorrect responses which were "close" to 
being correct (i.e. sounded like the correct response or 
highly associated with the correct response) were counted. 
When the frequency of intra-list intrusions was used as 
the dependent measure, an analysis of variance revealed 
neither a significant main effect for JK experience nor 
a significant main effect for study condition, Fs < 1.0. 
Intra-list intrusions did increase across lists (Xs = 
1.38, 1.23, 1.02 respectively) but the F ratio was only 
marginally significant, F (2,232) = 2.53, £ < .07. None 
of the interactions reached significance. When extra-
list intrusions and "close" responses were tabulated, 
so few were produced by each subject that the analyses 
of variance were not performed. Thus it is not likely 
that group differences in recall criterion existed in 
the present experiment. 
The relationship between recall and JK ratings was 
examined by comparing the proportion correct recall for 
items given each of the six JK ratings. For example, 
for items given a rating of "5", the proportion correctly 
recalled was calculated. These proportions for each 
group are plotted in Figure 2. Since not all subjects 
used each of the six JK categories, no analyses of var-
iance were performed on these proportions. Panels A and 
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B contain data from three JK trials for the STUDY-TEST-JK 
and STUDY-ONLY-JK groups respectively. The two CONTROL 
groups (STUDY-TEST-CONTROL & STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL) made JKs 
only on the third list~ and recall proportions for these 
groups are plotted in Panels C and D respectively. Exam-
ination of the curves reveals an increase in proportion 
recall as a function of JK rating. The higher the rating 
the greater the probability of recall. 
In describing the results for the STUDY-TEST-JK group 
(Panel A), it appears that ratings 1 and 2 and ratings 5 
and 6 can be grouped together. That is, a very low JK 
rating was likely to be followed by unsuccessful recall, 
and a very high rating was likely to be followed by suc-
cessful recall. For this group, ratings of 3 or 4 re-
sulted in approximately .50 probability of recall. 
The pattern of results is slightly different for the 
STUDY-ONLY-JK group. In Panel B it can be seen that rat-
ings 1, 2, and 3 tend to be grouped together in terms of 
recall probabilities, as are ratings of 4, 5, and 6. Fur-
thermore, the probability of recall for items given high 
JK ratings (5,6) by the STUDY-ONLY-JK group was not as 
high as the corresponding probability for the STUDY-TEST-
JK group. For each of the control groups, (Panels C & D) 
the List 3 curves are very similar to the List 3 curves 
for the corresponding JK groups. 
r 
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JK Analyses. Measures of JK accuracy should reflect 
the ability to predict what will be recalled and also the 
ability to predict what will not be recalled. Furthermore, 
the measure should not· be affected by degree-of-learning. 
That is, it should be possible for subjects recalling 30% 
and subjects recalling 70% of the items to produce equal 
accuracy scores. 
To derive an accuracy measure, the JK task was seen 
as analogous to an absolute-judgment recognition test. 
That is, the subject could respond "YES" (i.e. 4, 5, or 
6 on the JK scale) or "NO" (i.e. 1, 2, or 3 on the JK 
scale) and, of course, recall or non-recall will follow 
for an item. The combination of these events results in 
the contingency table contained in Table 4. A hit (H) 
represents the case of recall being predicted and suc-
cessful recall occurring. A correct rejection (CR) indi-
cates that recall was not predicted and, in fact, recall 
did not occur. These two outcomes represent correct pre-
dictions. Errors in prediction were termed false alarms 
(FA, i.e. recall was predicted but did not follow), and 
misses (M, i.e. recall was not predicted but did occur). 
The task was seen as the "detection" of a recallable 
memory trace. Thus, in a manner similar to signal detec-
tion paradigms, the trace could either be detected or 
fail to be detected when the trace was either actually 
there or actually not there. 
S8 
Table 4 
Contingency Table for JK Performance and Hypothetical Data 
"YES" JK 
"NO" JK 
Subject #1 
R R 
YES 11 1 
NO 1 11 
Measures of JK accuracy 
HITS 11 
p (Hit "YES") .916 
p (Hit RECALL) . 916 
HIT-FALSE ALARMS 10 
JK ERRORS 2 
BIAS 0 
Recall 
HIT 
MISS 
Non-recall 
FALSE ALARM 
CORRECT REJECTION 
Subject #2 Subject 
R R R 
11 11 11 
1 1 11 
11 11 
.so .916 
.916 .so 
0 10 
12 12 
-.833 +.833 
#3 
R 
1 
1 
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Accuracy can be defined in terms of JK err6rs, or 
M + FA. Underwood (1974) has shown that errors in a rec-
ognition task can be used as a measure of recognition sen-
sitivity. He reported· that errors were highly correlated 
with d', the sensitivity measure derived from signal de-
tection theory. Furthermore, Underwood has demonstrated 
that the subject's tendency to respond "YES" or "NO," or 
his/her criterion can be quantified by the following for-
mula: 
BIAS= (M - FA)/(M + FA) (1) 
Underwood reported high correlations between values re-
sulting from Formula 1 and beta as determined by signal 
detection theory. The bias measure and the sensitivity 
measure (JK errors) are independent of one another. The 
value produced by the bias formula would be positive if 
a subject exhibited a tendency for Ms (i.e. prediction 
of non-recall when recall followed), and a negative value 
would indicate a tendency for FAs (i.e. prediction of re-
call when non-recall followed). Therefore, in the present 
experiment, JK errors was used as the primary measure of 
accuracy, and the bias score (Formula 1) was used to 
examine differences in criterion. 
In addition to JK errors, four other dependent meas-
ures were considered for use: (1) total Hs; (2) H minus 
FAs; (3) p (H/"YES"), and (4) p CH/Recall). By examining 
data from three hypothetical subjects (see lower half of 
r 
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Table 4), these measures can be contrasted, and 'the reasons 
for using JK errors (M + FA) can be clarified. 
If Hs were the sole determinant of JK accuracy, it 
can be seen in the examples shown that all three hypothet-
ical subjects would perform equally well even though the 
subjects differ in the frequency of FAs and Ms. Further, 
this measure would be correlated with overall level of 
recall, since greater recall would provide more possibil-
ities for Hs. Also, this measure would be clearly inade-
quate as a measure of prediction accuracy since the abil-
ity to make CRs is not reflected by the score. 
Hart (1965) used H minus FAs as a measure of accuracy 
in an analogous paradigm. This is a common "correction 
for guessing" strategy used in recognition memory tasks. 
The FA rate is considered a guessing rate, and the hit 
rate is reduced to account for guessing. As seen in Table 
4, Subjects #1 and #3 would result in equal accuracy scores 
if this measure were used. Subject #3 performed less 
accurately when NO judgments are considered. Thus, this 
measure is inadequate since the accuracy of "NO" judgments 
does not influence the score. 
A third possible measure is the number of Hs relative 
to the number of "YES" JK ratings, or: 
p (H/"YES") = H/(H + FA) (2) 
If this measure were used, again Subjects #1 and #3 in 
Table 4 would produce equal accuracy scores. As was seen 
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above, these subjects differ in their ability to' accurately 
make NO judgments. 
A fourth measure to be considered is the number of Hs 
relative to the number.of correctly recalled items, or: 
p (H/Recall) = H/(H + M) (3) 
Using this measure of accuracy, subjects #1 and #2 from 
Table 4 would be equally accurate. This measure does not 
detect differences in prediction for words which are not 
recalled. Misses rather than FAs are crucial to this meas-
ure, and it can be seen that Subject #2 produced many FAs 
which did not affect the accuracy score. 
Table 4 also contains the accuracy score as measured 
by M + FA and the criterion scores produced by Formula 1 
for the three subjects. By examining both measures, dif-
ferences in JK performance can be determined. Subject #1 
is most accurate, and Subjects #2 and #3 are equally ac-
curate. However, when criterion or bias scores are exam-
ined for the latter two subjects, different response ten-
dencies can be observed. Therefore, the present experi-
ment used JK errors as the primary accuracy measure and 
Formula 1 as the measure of bias. 
In the present experiment, JK accuracy should be in-
dependent of overall degree of learning. As was stated 
above, the STUDY-TEST groups recalled more items than the 
STUDY-ONLY groups, and thus if the JK errors measure was 
sensitive to degree-of-learning, any differences in JK 
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accuracy between groups may be due to the fact that unequal 
degree of learning was obtained. To be sure that this was 
not the case, within each group, fast and slow learners 
were determined. The analyses of variance included the 
fast-slow distinction as a factor. If no main effect for 
fast-slow learners is obtained and if no interactions be-
tween fast-slow learners and any other factor is obtained, 
then it can be concluded that the JK errors measure was 
independent of degree-of-learning. Fast and slow learners 
were determined by the total number recalled on the first 
two lists. Within a group, the 15 subjects above the 
median constituted the fast learners, and the 15 subjects 
below the median constituted the slow learners. When more 
than one subject scored the median value, the assignment 
was made randomly in order to assure an equal number of 
subjects in each group. 
The mean number of JK errors for each of the four 
groups (collapsed across fast and slow learners) is dis-
played in Figure 3. Two separate analyses were done on 
these data. First, only those groups which made JKs on 
all three lists were considered (i.e. the JK groups). 
Table 5 contains the summary table for the 2 (study con-
dition) by 2 (fast-slow learners) by 3 (lists) repeated 
measures analysis of variance using JK errors as the de-
pendent measure. A significant main effect for study 
condition was obtained, F (1,56) = 10.07, ~ < .001. 
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Figure 3. Mean number of JK errors as a functio.n'of 1 ist. 
(Control group JK data is for List 3 only.) 
r 
Table 5 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table for JK Errors 
(MISSES + FALSE ALARMS) for the STAND-JK 
And STUDY-JK Groups for All Three Lists 
Source SS 
Study cond. (ST) 186.05 
Ability (A) 18.05 
ST by A .93 
error (between) 1034.35 
Lists (L) 
L by ST 
L by A 
L by ST by A 
Error (within) 
* p < .01 
** p < .001 
48.14 
90.83 
16.03 
7.08 
495.88 
df 
1 
1 
1 
56 
2 
2 
2 
2 
112 
MS 
186.05 
18.05 
.93 
18.47 
24.07 
45.42 
8.02 
3.54 
4.43 
f 
10.07 ** 
<1. 0 
<1. 0 
5.44 * 
10.26 ** 
1. 81 
<1. 0 
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Fewer JK errors were made by the STUDY-TEST-JK group (X = 
4.88) than by the STUDY-ONLY-JK group (X = 6.92). A sig-
nificant main effect for lists was also obtained, F (2,112) 
= 5.44, £ < .01. Errors generally declined across lists. 
Furthermore, the study condition by list interaction was 
highly significant, F (2,112) = 10.26, £ < .001. Inspec-
tion of Figure 3 reveals that the mean JK errors for the 
STUDY-TEST-JK and the STUDY-ONLY-JK groups decreased at 
equal rates across the first two lists. Furthermore, it 
can be seen that the STUDY-ONLY-JK continued to show a 
decrease in errors between Lists 2 and 3. For the STUDY-
TEST-JK group, on the other hand, a sharp increase in JK 
errors between List 2 and 3 resulted. Finally, the main 
effect for fast-slow learners failed to reach significance, 
F < 1.0. The mean JK errors for the fast learners were 
not different than for the slow learners. Also, the fast-
slow factor did not interact with study condition (F < 
1.0) or lists, F (2,112) = 1.81, £ > .10. 
A second JK analysis used data from all four groups. 
A 2 (JK experience) by 2 (study condition) by 2 (fast-slow 
learners) analysis of variance was performed to examine JK 
accuracy (M + FA) for List 3 only. The source table is 
contained in Table 6. As can be seen, none of the F ratios 
reached significance. Study condition for List 1 and 2 
apparently had no effect on List 3 JK accuracy. Further-
more, experience with the JK task, regardless of study 
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Table 6 
Analysis of Variance Summary Table 
For JK Errors on List 3 Only 
Source SS df MS F 
JK Experience (JK) 19.20 1 19.20 1. 86 
Study cond. (ST) .83 1 .83 < 1. 0 
Ability (A) 1. 20 1 1. 20 < 1. 0 
JK by ST 1. 20 1 1. 20 < 1.0 
JK by A .30 1 .30 < 1.0 
ST by A 3.33 1 3.33 < 1. 0 
JK by ST by A 4.03 1 4.03 < 1. 0 
error 1157.84 112 10.34 
r 
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condition, had no effect on JK accuracy. The study condi-
tion by JK experience interaction also failed to reach 
significance. Also, none of the F ratios involving fast-
slow learners reached significance. 
The fast-slow learner factor used in the previous 
two analyses of variance produced no significant effects. 
This suggests that the JK errors measure of accuracy is 
not dependent on degree-of-learning, and gives support 
to the validity of this measure. 
Analysis of JK response bias. A second important 
aspect of the difference in JK performance between the 
STUDY-TEST and STUDY-ONLY groups concerns response biases. 
That is, the STUDY-TEST-JK group and the STUDY-ONLY-JK 
group may have had different tendencies to respond YES 
or NO on the JK scale. In order to make strong conclusions 
about JK accuracy (sensitivity) differences in bias must 
be examined. 
The bias score derived from Formula 1 can be used to 
determine response tendencies. This measure is theoret-
ically independent of the JK errors (sensitivity) measure; 
and in general, this measure reveals differences in cri-
terion or "cutoff" levels .. That is, it measures what level 
of confidence or what degree of perceived (memory) strength 
is necessary in order for a subject to respond YES on the 
JK scale. A positive bias score indicates a realtively 
"strict" or "conservative" criterion (i.e. more Ms than 
r 
FAs were observed). In this case, the subject must be 
relatively sure of the presence of an item in memory in 
order for a YES JK to be made. A negative value, on the 
other hand, indicates a less "strict" or more liberal 
criterion, and less confidence is necessary in this case 
in order to respond YES on the JK scale. 
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Therefore, differences in JK performance could either 
be due to differences in the true ability to detect or 
assess an item's strength in memory or be due to differ-
ences in the criterion above which an item's presence in 
memory is acknowledged. By examining bias as well as JK 
errors greater understanding of the JK performance can 
be attained. 
Table 7 contains the mean bias score (from Formula 1) 
for the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLY-JK groups for all 
three lists. An analysis of variance on the data from 
Table 9 revealed only a marginally significant main ef-
fect for study condition, F (1,56) = 3.94, £ < .1. It 
can be seen that the STUDY-ONLY-JK group had a slightly 
greater tendency to commit FAs than did the STUDY-TEST-
JK group. That is, the criterion for the latter group 
was more strict than that for the former group. The 
study condition by list interaction did not reach sig-
nificance, F (2,112) = 1.63, £ > .1. When List 3 bias 
scores were examined for all four groups, no differences 
between groups was observed. 
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Table 7 
Mean Bias Score as a Function of Group and List 
List 
1 2 3 4 
STUDY-TEST-JK -.03 .09 -.16 -.03 
STUDY-ONLY-JK -.47 -.20 -.29 -.32 
STUDY-TEST-CONTROL .00 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL -.14 
Additional JK Analyses. 
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In the JK analyses reported 
thus far, JK errors have been of concern. In order to 
more fully understand differences in JK performance be-
tween groups, correct JK responses (i.e. Hs and CRs) must 
also be examined. Thus separate analyses of Hs, Ms, FAs 
and CRs were performed in order to describe the pattern 
of JK outcomes across lists. Furthermore, the mean num-
ber of YES JKs (i.e. ratings of 4, S, or 6) for each 
group was tabulated, since this measure provides a con-
text within which changes in Hs or FAs can be explained. 
A YES judgment can only result in an H or FA, and con-
versely, a NO judgment can only result in an M or CR. 
Thus the total number of YES JKs (or NO JKs) must pro-
vide a "baseline" around which changes in the specific 
JK outcomes can be explained. Later in this paper, this 
pattern of Hs, Ms, FAs, and CRs, will be used to infer 
differences in the ability "to know what is known" and 
"to know what is not known." 
Table 8 contains the mean number of Hs, Ms, FAs, and 
CRs across lists for the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLY-JK 
groups as well as the means for List 3 for the STUDY-TEST-
CONTROL and STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL groups. Also, the mean 
number of "YES" JKs for each list for each group is con-
tained in Table 9. 
Five separate 2 (study condition) by 2 (fast-slow 
learners) by 3 (lists) analyses of variance were performed 
r 
71 
Table 8 
Mean: Number of Hits, Misses, False Alarms, and Correct 
Rejections as a Function of Lists 
List 
Hits 1 2 3 x 
STUDY-TEST-JK 9.76 13.83 8.57 10.72 
STUDY-ONLY-JK 7.76 8.80 7.43 8.00 
STUDY-TEST-CONTROL 7.76 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL 7.70 
Misses 
STUDY-TEST-JK 2.16 2.07 2.40 2.21 
STUDY-ONLY-JK 1. 90 2.43 1.66 2.00 
STUDY-TEST-CONTROL 3.03 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL 2.70 
False Alarms 
STUDY-TEST-JK 2.76 1. 76 3.50 2.67 
STUDY-ONLY-JK 6.23 4.26 4.26 4.91 
STUDY-TEST-CONTROL 3.86 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL 3.83 
Correct Rejections 
STUDY-TEST-JK 9.30 6.33 9.53 8.39 
STUDY-ONLY-JK 8.10 8.50 10.63 9.08 
STUDY-TEST-CONTROL 9.33 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL 9.76 
r 
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Table 9 
Mean Number of YES Judgments as a Function of List 
STUDY-TEST-JK 
STUDY-ONLY-JK 
STUDY-TEST-CONTROL 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL 
1 
12.53 
14.00 
List 
2 
15.60 
13.06 
3 
12.06 
11. 70 
11. 63 
11. 53 
x 
13.40 
12.92 
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in order to describe the pattern of Hs, Ms, FAs, CRs, and 
YES JKs for the two JK groups. 
The pattern for Hs will be described first. The 
analysis of variance yielded a significant study condition 
by list interaction, F (2,112) = 10.53, £ < .001. A sim-
ple effects analysis revealed that for the STUDY-ONLY-JK 
group, Hs were constant across lists, F (1,112) = 2.80, 
£ > .10. For the STUDY-TEST-JK group, the simple effects 
analysis revealed significant differences in Hs across 
lists, F (1,112) = 42.05, £ < .001. Hits increased across 
the first two lists and then decreased on List 3 for the 
STUDY-TEST-JK group. 
When Ms were used as the dependent measure (see Table 
8) there were no differences between the STUDY-TEST-JK and 
STUDY-ONLY-JK groups across lists, F < 1.0. Therefore, 
differences in Ms could not have accounted for differences 
in JK performance. 
The third analysis of variance concerned FAs. The 
study condition by list interaction reached significance, 
F (2,112) = 6.65, £ < .01. A simple effects analysis re-
vealed differences across lists for the STUDY-ONLY-JK 
group, F (1,112) = 6.91, £ < .01. For this group, FAs 
were high on List 1, and then decreased and remained 
constant for the second and third lists. The simple 
effects analysis also revealed differences across lists 
for the STUDY-TEST-JK group, F (1,112) = 4.05, £ < .OS. 
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For this group, FAs were initially lower than for the 
STUDY-ONLY-JK group but then increased on List 3. There-
fore, changes in FAs are likely to account for differences 
in JK performance. 
The fourth analysis of variance used the frequency 
of CRs as the dependent measure. The study condition by 
list interaction was significant, F (2,112) = 6.93, p < 
.01. Again, a simple effects analysis revealed differ-
ences in CRs across lists for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, 
F (1, 112) = 7. 38, E_ < • 01. For this group, CRs stead-
ily increased across lists. For the STUDY-TEST-JK group, 
CRs decreased from List 1 to List 2 and then increased 
on List 3, F (1,112) = 12.67, E.. < .01. 
The fifth analysis used the frequency of YES judg-
ments as the dependent measure. There was no significant 
main effect for study condition, F < 1.0. Thus, even 
though the STUDY-TEST-JK group recalled more items than 
the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, the mean number of YES JKs did 
not differ for these two groups. The. study condition by 
list interaction reached significance, F (1,112) = 4.40, 
p < .OS. YES JKs consistently decreased across lists for 
the STUDY-ONLY-JK group. For the STUDY-TEST-JK group, 
YES judgments increased from List 1 to List 2 but then 
decreased on List 3. 
The frequency of Hs, Ms, FAs, CRs, and YES JKs was 
also examined for List 3 taking into account the CONTROL 
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groups as well as the JK groups. No significant main ef-
fects or interactions were obtained when Hs, FAs, CRs, 
or YES JKs were used as dependent measures. However, when 
Ms were considered, a significant main effect for JK exper-
ience was obtained, F e1,112) = 4.39, ~ < .OS. That is, 
the CONTROL groups committed more Ms ex= 2.86) than did 
the JK groups ex= 2.03). Thus, while JK accuracy on List 
3 for the JK groups did not differ from that for the CON-
TROL groups, a difference in the type of errors produced 
was obtained. 
Testing Effects. It has been suggested above that 
the JK task is analogous to a signal detection paradigm. 
That is, an item in memory can be reported to be either 
present or absent when, in fact, that item was either 
present or absent. The analogy is not perfect, however. 
That is, in a signal detection task, the experimenter 
unambiguously controls the presence or absence of the 
signal, but in the JK task, the presence of an item is 
inferred from the subject's later recall performance. 
Furthermore, since a considerable time lapse occurs be-
tween the JK rating and testing of an item, the item 
could be forgotten during this interval. Thus, suppose 
a subject assigned a high JK rating to an item, and sup-
pose that the item was, in fact, available. Interference 
from other list items could result in the item being un-
available at time of test, and thus the subject's 
r 
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prediction, in this case, would be incorrect. The opposite 
situation could also occur. Facilitation from other list 
items could cause an item, previously rated as unavailable 
(i.e. a NO JK), to become available at the time of test. 
Again, the JK in this case would be considered inaccurate. 
To consider these possibilities, the change in the 
frequency of Ms and FAs within a test list was examined. 
For this analysis, the number of items intervening between 
the rating and the testing of each pair (i.e. lag) was 
tabulated. For each test form, the distribution of lags 
was divided into quartiles. The mean proportion of Ms and 
FAs as a function of lag quartile is plotted in Figures 4 
and 5 respectively. Two 2 (study condition) by 3 (lists) 
by 4 (lags) repeated measures analyses of variance were 
performed on these data. For Ms, there was a significant 
main effect for lags, F (3,174) = 8.66, £ < .01. Overall, 
there was a decrease in Ms across lags. Neither the main 
effect for study condition nor any of the interactions 
reached significance. Furthermore, it can be seen in 
Panels C and D of Figure 4 that for the two CONTROL groups, 
List 3 Ms decreased as a function of lag. 
8.95, £ < .01.) 
(F (3,348) = 
For FAs, the analysis of variance revealed a signif-
icant main effect for lags, F (3,174) = 12.65, £ < .01. 
A general increase across lags was observed for FAs. The 
study condition by list by lag interaction reached 
r 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 
LAG 
Figure 4. Mean proportion misses as a function of 
lags and list. 
(Panels: A--STUDY-TEST-JK; B--STUDY-ONLY-JK; 
C--STUDY-TEST-CONTROL; D--STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL)1 
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Figure 5. Mean proportion false alarms as a function 
of lags and list. 
(Panels: A--STUDY-TEST-JK· B--STUDY-ONLY-JK· 
' '' 
C--STUDY-TEST-CONTROL; D--STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL) 
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significance indicating that the change in FAs across lags 
was not identical for the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLY-JK 
groups across the three lists, (F (6,348) = 4.07, p < .01.) 
A simple effects analyiis revealed that for the STUDY-TEST-
JK group, FAs did not differ across lags for the first list, 
F (1,464) = 2.21, £ > .10, nor for the second list, F < 1.0. 
However, for the third list, a significant linear trend 
across lags was obtained, ~ (1,484) = 5.84, £ < .01. For 
the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, the simple effects analysis re-
vealed differences in FAs as a function of lags on List 1 
and 2, but not on List 3. A significant linear trend was 
obtained for List 1, F (1,464) = 18.46, £ < .001, and for 
List 2, F (1,464) = 8.95, p < .01. No difference in linear 
trend was observed for the first two lists, F < 1.0. In 
Figure S, it can be seen that when the two CONTROL groups 
(Panels C & D) were included_ in the analysis. FAs general-
ly increased as a function of lag on List 3, F (3,348) = 
3.39, ~ < .OS. It must be noted that these results are 
partially dependent on the total number of recalled items 
as a function of lag. Table 10 contains the proportion 
correct recall as a function of lag. It can be seen that 
as lag increases, proportion correct recall decreases. 
Thus, conclusions about FAs and Ms as a function of lag 
should be interpreted in light of the fact that recall 
also decreases as a function of lag. 
Table 10 
Proportion Correvt Recall as a Function 
·of List and Lag 
List Lag 
STUDY-TEST-JK 1 2 3 4 
1 .533 .544 .438 .472 
2 .711 .644 .643 .649 
3 .561 .444 .405 .466 
STUDY-ONLY-JK 
1 .527 .405 .344 .333 
2 .610 .444 .410 .406 
3 .478 .355 .372 .311 
STUDY-TEST-CONTROL 
3 .605 . 361 .433 .399 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL 
3 .488 .477 .427 .338 
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DISCUSSION 
The results of this experiment show that, in general, 
subjects can predict which PAs will be recalled on an up-
coming test. The distinction between the STUDY-TEST-JK 
and STUDY-ONLY-JK groups allows several specific conclu-
sions to be made regarding the ability to judge what is 
known. 
The Role of Test Trials. In a PA task, JK accuracy 
(M + FA) appears to benefit from knowledge of previous 
test trial performance. The results obtained in this ex-
periment provide two lines of evidence in support of this 
conclusion. First, the STUDY-TEST-JK group made more ac-
curate predictions on each of the first two lists than 
did the STUDY-ONLY-JK group. Secondly, the STUDY-TEST-JK 
group revealed a marked increase in JK errors on the third 
list when test trials before the JKs were removed. That 
is, from the increase in errors, it can be inferred that 
the subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK group had developed a 
strategy for making JKs which was at least partially based 
on the success of previous test trial attempts. 
The conclusion that JKs are facilitated by the pres-
ence of preceeding test trials is partially dependent on 
the assumption that subjects can remember what they have 
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recalled earlier, and some evidence exists which 'supports 
this assumption. Masur et al. (1973) reported that young 
children could accurately recognize items they had recalled 
on an immediately prece.eding test trial. Using adult sub-
jects, Lockhart (1975) presented a series of 10 free re-
call lists followed by a final recognition test on the 
words from all 10 lists. Subjects were then asked to cir-
cle any recognized items which they remembered having re-
called. Accuracy of discriminating recalled from non-re-
called items was found to be quite high. Thus, given this 
evidence, in the present study it can be reasonably assumed 
that subjects in the STUDY-TEST-JK group could distinguish 
those items that they had recalled from those that they had 
failed to recall on the test trials preceeding the JK trial. 
Therefore it is likely that subjects were implicitly reason-
ing "since I got it right on the last two test trials, I 
should get it right again." 
The Role of Familiarity. As familiarity with task de-
mands increases, JK accuracy increases. The STUDY-TEST-JK 
group revealed an increase in JK accuracy across the first 
two lists, and for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group JK accuracy in-
creased across all three lists. From the performance of 
the two CONTROL groups, it appears that the familiarity 
with PA learning, rather than the familiarity with the JK 
task itself, is crucial. That is, on the third list, the 
two CONTROL groups that had no previous JK task experience, 
, 
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performed as accurately on the third list as did.the two 
JK groups. Thus while JK accuracy can be said to increase 
with practice, actual JK task experience is not as impor-
tant as is experience with learning under the constraints 
of the task at hand. 
Specific JK Performance Differences. In order to more 
fully understand differences in JK performance between the 
STUDY-TEST-JK and the STUDY-ONLY-JK groups, two specific 
questions must be answered. First, both these groups re-
vealed a decrease in JK errors across the first two lists, 
and it should be determined whether, for both these groups, 
the decrease occurred for the same reason. That is, did 
the same pattern of Hs, Ms, FAs, and CRs result for both 
these groups on the first two lists? The second question 
concerns the reasons for the increase in JK errors on the 
third list for the STUDY-TEST-JK group. 
The results relevant to the improvement in JK accuracy 
by the STUDY-ONLY-JK group will be summarized first. From 
the analyses of JK outcomes, the following four findings 
can be noted: (1) YES JKs declined across lists; (2) Hs 
and Ms remained constant; (3) FAs generally decreased 
across lists, and (4) CRs increased across lists. Given 
this pattern of results, any changes in JK performance 
must have been due to FAs and CRs, since the other out-
comes did not change. Furthermore, since YES judgments 
decreased across lists, differences in the accuracy of 
r 
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NO judgments were likely to account for the JK improvement. 
That is, FAs indicate the lack of the ability to detect 
what is not in memory; and CRs reflect the ability to suc-
cessfully indicate thai an item is not in memory. Since 
FAs were decreasing while Hs remained constant, and since 
CRs increased while Ms remained constant, the ability to 
know what is not known was apparently accounting for the 
improvement in JK accuracy for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group. 
With respect to the increase in JK accuracy across 
the first two lists shown by the STUDY-TEST-JK group, the 
following findings should be considered: (1) YES JKs and 
Hs increased; (2) Ms did not change; (3) FAs decreased 
slightly across the first two lists, and (4) CRs decreased 
sharply across the first two lists. From this pattern of 
results, it can be shown that Hs are responsible for the 
increase in accuracy across the first two lists. The 
reasoning is as follows. Since FAs decreased while Hs 
increased, the ability to know what is known (as opposed 
to what is not known) must have improved. The ability to 
know what is not known was less likely to account for the 
improvement because CRs decreased and Ms remained constant. 
In fact, the ability to predict what was not known was 
probably constant across the first two lists for this 
group. That is, since the overall frequency of NO judg-
ments declined, and since Ms did not change, a decline in 
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CRs would have to occur. This would not necessarily imply 
a decrease in the accuracy of NO judgments. 
Correlations support the conclusion that Hs are respon-
sible for the increase in accuracy. That is, if the corre-
lation between Hs and JK errors increases from List 1 to 
List 2 for the STUDY-TEST-JK group, Hs are likely to be 
implicated in the improvement. The correlation increased 
from -.41 to -.49 on List 2. 
Thus for the STUDY-TEST-JK group, the increase in JK 
accuracy across the first two lists was probably due to 
an increase in the ability to know what was known; while 
for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, the improvement was due to 
an increase in the ability to know what was not known. 
The STUDY-TEST-JK group showed a marked increase in 
JK errors between Lists 2 and 3. This increase correspond-
ed with the removal of test trials before the JK task on 
the third list. Given the analyses of the JK outcomes, 
the following results relevant to this increase in errors 
can be considered: (1) YES JKs and Hs decreased; (2) FAs 
slightly increased; (3) CRs increased across lists, and 
(4) Ms did not change. These observations are made rel-
ative to List 2 JK performance. The decline in YES judg-
ments (or increase in NO judgments) was accompanied by an 
increase in CRs (with Ms remaining unchanged). Thus, on 
the one hand, accuracy of NO judgments cannot account for 
the decrease in accuracy because, in fact, the accuracy 
of NO judgments improved on List 3. On the other hand, 
FAs are likely to account for the increase in errors. 
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That is, YES JKs and Hs both declined but not at the same 
rate. Given that a YES JK can only result in an H or FA, 
it must be concluded that FAs would have to increase since 
the decline in YES JKs was less than the decline in Hs. 
This suggests that a greater likelihood of FAs was causing 
the decrease in accuracy. Correlations support this con-
clusion. The correlation between JK errors and FAs rose 
from .48 on List 2 to .SS on List 3. An increase in FAs 
indicates a decrease in the ability to know what is not 
known. 
Bias Scores and Testing Effects. Additional differ-
ences in the JK performance of the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-
ONLY-JK groups can be pointed out by examining the criter-
ion or bias scores and the testing (or lag) effect data. 
Furthermore, it should be determined whether or not the 
reasons given for JK improvement for these two groups are 
consistent with bias scores and lag effects. 
Conclusions about the relationship between specific 
.patterns of JK outcomes (i.e. Hs, Ms, FAs, and CRs) and 
bias scores should be prefaced by a brief discussion of 
the possible redundancy (or interdependence) of these 
measures. Bias scores reflect a relative tendency for Ms 
or FAs, and from this measure, either a "strict'' or "lax" 
criterion is inferred. Theoretically, this measure is 
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distinct from the absolute level of FAs or Ms considered 
separately. Thus a subject exhibitirig many FAs would not 
show a lax criterion if he also exhibits an equal number 
of Ms. However, this assumption cannot be unequivocally 
accepted given the fact that, in the present experiment, 
FAs correlated -.71 with bias scores, and Ms correlated 
.78 with bias scores. Thus, the following statements 
must be interpreted cautiously, knowing that the bias 
scores and the Ms and FAs are not totally independent. 
For the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, it can be concluded 
that subjects made JKs using a relatively "lax" criter-
ion. That is, since there was a greater tendency for FAs 
for the STUDY-ONLY-JK group than for the STUDY-TEST-JK 
group, it can be inferred that less "strength" of the 
memory trace was required for a YES judgment for the for-
mer group than for the latter group. As accuracy of NO 
judgments increased across lists, one would expect to 
observe a more and more "strict" criterion being employed. 
An increase in the accuracy of NO judgments implies an 
increase in the ability to asses an item's memory strength 
_as inadequate for later retrieval. This can be seen as a 
"raising" of the level of memory strength necessary for a 
YES JK response. In fact bias scores did become less neg-
ative (or more strict) on the second and third lists rel-
ative to the first list. Thus, for the STUDY-ONLY-JK 
group, the criterion data are consistent with the conclusion 
11 
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that accuracy of NO judgments accounted for the improve-
ment in JK accuracy across lists. 
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As was stated earlier, an increase in FAs within a 
list as lag (number of intervening events between rating 
and testing) increases indicates that other list items 
interfered with items given YES JKs and thus caused these 
items to be unavailable at time of test. If a lax criter-
ion were being used, then one would expect greater lag 
effects than if a strict criterion were being used. That 
is, items with low levels of memory strength are more 
likely to be interferred with than items with higher levels 
of memory strength. For the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, lag ef-
fects for FAs were greater on List 1 and List 2, and then 
became less extreme on the third list. This is as expected 
since the criterion became more strict across lists. A 
strict criterion indicates that only well-learned items 
are given YES JKs, and well-learned items are less likely 
to suffer from interference across time. 
The improvement in JK accuracy across the first two 
lists shown by the STUDY-TEST-JK group was due to an in-
crease in Hs. An H implies that the perceived level of 
memory strength was adequate to assure later recall. This 
should correspond with a rather "strict" JK criterion; and 
relative t6 the STUDY-ONLY-JK group, a more strict criter-
ion was employed on the first two lists by the STUDY-TEST-
JK group. Furthermore, lag effects for FAs were minimal 
across the first two lists for the STUDY-TEST-JK.group. 
This indicates that, in general, only well-learned items 
were given YES JKs. 
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On List 3, the STUDY-TEST-JK group revealed a decrease 
in JK accuracy and it was suggested that FAs or inaccurate 
YES JKs accounted for this poorer performance. That is, 
subjects in this group more frequently gave YES JKs to 
items which were eventually not recalled when test trials 
were removed than when test trials were present before the 
JK trial. As would be expected, this corresponded with a 
more lax criterion on the third list than on the first two 
lists. Again, the lag effect data for FAs for this group 
is consistent with the lowering of the criterion. For the 
STUDY-TEST-JK group, there was a greater lag effect for FAs 
on the third list than on either of the first two lists. 
For all groups, Ms generally decreased as a function 
of lags. Two possible interpretations are available for 
this effect. First, subjects could have developed a strat-
egy of withholding responses or of selectivity ignoring 
items for which they remembered giving NO JKs. Thus, if 
an item was given a NO judgment, non-recall would result 
in an accurate prediction. Perhaps, the subjects realized 
this only as they progressed through the test list, and 
thus, the greater the lag, the greater the likelihood of 
their having developed a strategy of selective rehearsal 
or withholding of known responses. This interpretation 
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can be rejected for several reasons. First, subjects were 
instructed that under the "game" rules, they would always 
be penalized for non-recall regardless of the prediction. 
In fact, if they were trying to "beat" the game, Ms should 
have increased since an M always resulted in gaining points 
and a CR (i.e. deliberate withholding or selective rehear-
sal of an item given a NO JK would result in a CR) always 
resulted in losing points. A more convincing argument 
against the notion that subjects were withholding or se-
lectively rehearsing items and thereby causing the lag 
effects is that the lag effects for Ms were constant a-
cross all three lists. If subjects were becoming aware 
of these strategies with increasing JK task experience, 
then the lag effect should have been "learned" by the time 
the subjects reached the third list. Thus, one would not 
expect lag effects for Ms on the third list. Furthermore, 
if a strategy of withholding or selectively rehearsing 
were being employed, memory for an items rating at the 
time of test would be necessary. The shorter the interval 
between rating and testing, the more likely subjects would 
be to remember which rating was assigned. Thus, at short 
lags, one would expect fewer Ms than at longer lags. The 
opposite results were observed. 
Lag effects for Ms were also obtained in a similar ex-
periment by Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) and the procedures 
they employed were also designed to prevent selective 
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rehearsal or withholding. In the first experiment reported 
by these authors, lag effects were obtained with highly 
practiced subjects who were specifically warned against 
the use of withholding or selectively rehearsing items. 
In their second experiment, they used a probed recall tech-
nique, such that the subject did not know which of five 
presented items would be tested. Many Ms were observed 
when the probed item was the last item in the list. Thus 
these authors also found lag effects for Ms when the pos-
sibility of withholding and selective rehearsal were re-
moved. 
A more acceptable interpretation of the lag effects 
for Ms concerns facilitation and interference from other 
list items and the subject's perception of the task. It 
should be noted that, in general, items with short lags 
occurred relatively late in the rating list and relatively 
early in the test list. Furthermore, an M means that an 
item judged to be of insufficient strength was in fact of 
sufficient strength to assure recall. The misjudgment 
could be due to either a "misperception" of an item's 
_strength or an unexpected increase of an item's strength. 
First consider "misperceptions" of memory strength. A 
subject had no way of telling which items would be tested 
and thus he might have been judging an item's memory 
strength as sufficient or insufficient to assure recall 
at the "expected" lag. The expected or average lag would 
have been about 24 items. Thus, an item judged to be of 
insufficient strength at the expected lag may have been 
92 
of sufficient strength at lags less than the expected 24. 
Thus, if Ms were to occur, they would most likely occur 
at the shortest lags. The second reason for misjudgments 
could be that some unexpected increase in an item's memory 
strength occurred. This increase could be said to be due 
to facilitation from other list items. However, since 
over time, interference would be causing a decrease in an 
items availability, an item would become available because 
of facilitation only at the shorter lags. That is, if an 
item's strength is low to begin with and is decreasing 
across time, any events which could increase that item's 
strength and would be most effective when strength is 
highest. In other words, facilitation would be most 
likely at the shortest lags. This was likely to account 
for the lag effects for Ms. 
JK Performance by the CONTROL Groups. On List 3, 
the two CONTROL groups predicted their recall just as 
accurately as did the two JK groups. Furthermore, the 
specific patterns of JK outcomes, the bias scores, and 
the testing effects found for the CONTROL groups were 
not markedly different from the JK groups. The only dif-
ference was that the CONTROL groups exhibited more Ms 
than the JK groups on the third list indicating that the 
CONTROL groups had a slightly greater tendency to be 
inaccurate with NO judgments. However, overall ·accuracy 
as measured by JK errors (M + FA) did not differ between 
groups on the third list. Two interpretations of the 
failure to find a difference between the CONTROL and JK 
groups can be offered. 
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It can be suggested that the kinds of information 
that contribute to JKs are inherently involved in the 
learning of a PA list. That is, perhaps subjects in the 
STUDY-TEST-CONTROL group were covertly deciding, for exam-
ple, that more study time should be spent on items that 
they had missed on preceeding tests. Subjects in the 
STUDY-ONLY-CONTROL group may have been allocating atten-
tion or processing effort on the basis of what can be 
called implicit JKs. Arbuckle and Cuddy (1969) have sug-
gested this commonality of demands between a JK task and 
a standard PA learning task. Zacks (1969) also suggested 
that covert self-regulation of processing efforts may be 
occurring in PA learning. If this interpretation is to 
be accepted, fast learners should have been more accurate 
than slow learners, and this was found not to be the case. 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that PA learning inher-
ently involves those processes on which JKs are based. 
A second interpretation of the equal JK accuracy 
shown by the CONTROL and JK groups on List 3 is based on 
the role of tests. In any learning task (i.e. free recall, 
recognition as well as PA learning) tests provide ''feedbac~' 
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to learners (LaPort & Voss, 1974a, 1974b). Since all groups 
were tested on each list, all subjects must have gained an 
understanding of what was required for "mastery" of a list 
given the constraints of the learning procedures. As was 
concluded above, familiarity with the learning procedures 
rather than with the JK task was crucial to eventual JK 
performance. Furthermore, with learning experience with 
a particular type of learning material (i.e. PAs) subjects 
could also attain a greater understanding of what is neces-
sary for learning. Since subjects in the CONTROL groups 
had an equal amount of learning and testing experience as 
the JK groups, their understanding of task demands or their 
acquisition of "process knowledge" would have been equiva-
lent to that for subjects in the JK groups. Thus, JK per-
formance for the JK groups and the CONTROL groups might 
have been equal because both groups acquired the appropri-
ate process knowledge on the first two lists. This expla-
nation is admittedly speculative, and the present experi-
ment did not include control groups relevant to this ques-
tion. This issue could be directly tested if the experi-
ment were replicated with the addition of two groups. Sup-
pose one group was instructed to learn the first two PA 
lists but was not tested on the items, and then learned 
the third list, made JK ratings, and received a test trial. 
If this group was found to be less accurate than a group 
given the STUDY-ONLY-JK instructions, one could conclude 
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that testing was crucial to the development of ptocess 
knowledge useful for later JK performance. Furthermore, 
suppose one group ~f subjects received the STUDY-ONLY-JK 
instructions but that for the first two lists as different 
type of PA was to be learned (i.e. letter-digit pairs). 
If the JK accuracy shown by this group was less than that 
shown by a group that learned CVC-word PAs on all three 
lists, then it could be concluded that process knowledge 
is partially dependent on the type of material that is to 
be learned. If these results were obtained, it could be 
concluded that equivalent process knowledge had been ac-
quired by the JK and CONTROL groups in the present exper-
iment. 
Stimulus Knowledge. Thus far in this discussion, 
only two proposed sources of information which contribute 
to JKs have been discussed: process knowledge and implic-
it retrieval. In the introduction to this paper stimulus 
knowledge, or an understanding of those item characteris-
tics which determine learning ease, was suggested as a 
source of information relevant to a JK. Arbuckle and 
Cuddy (1969) concluded that the perception of the ease 
or difficulty of items was important for the prediction 
of recall or non-recall. Perhaps certain pairs used in 
the present experiment were more easily associated than 
others, and thus if a subject were aware of these a priori 
differences in ease of learning (EL), JKs might have 
96 
been influenced by this stimulus knowledge. To determine 
whether JKs were related to the perceived EL for the given 
pairs, and to see if JKs contained any information other 
than stimulus knowledge the following analysis was per-
formed. 
The proportion correct recall for each of the 72 pairs 
was determined by collapsing recall data for the first two 
lists from the CONTROL groups. Data from these groups were 
used in order to obtain measures of recall probability that 
are uninfluenced by the performance of JKs. Further, the 
mean JK rating assigned to each pair was computed by col-
lapsing JK ratings from the STUDY-TEST-JK and STUDY-ONLY-
JK groups for all three lists. Thus, each mean was based 
on 60 ratings. 
To obtain EL ratings, the 72 PAs were shown to 36 ad-
ditional subjects who were naive to the purposes of the 
present experiment. These subjects were instructed to 
pretend that they were shown these pairs several times and 
that for testing, only the eve would be shown and the pro-
duction of the response term would be required. The sub-
. jects were asked to rate each pair on how easily it could 
be learned. A six-point scale ranging from very difficult 
(1) to very easy (6) was provided. Five seconds were 
allowed for the rating of each pair. 
It was found that the items' mean EL ratings were 
highly correlated with the items' probability of recall 
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(r(70) = .63, £ < .001) and with the mean JK rating assigned 
to an item (r(70) = .73, £ < .001). Moreover from the orig-
inal subjects it was learned that the probability of recall 
of an item correlated .83 (df = 70, ~ < .001) with the mean 
JK rating. If stimulus knowledge (i.e. mean EL rating) 
completely accounted for the relationship between recall 
and mean JKs, then a part correlation between probability 
of recall and mean JK predicted by EL, should be near zero. 
The part correlation was significantly greater than zero, 
(r(70) = .54, £ < .001). The decrease in the correlation 
indicates that to a certain extent, JKs were related to 
perceived EL. However, stimulus knowledge does not com-
pletely account for an item's JK rating. Under different 
learning conditions perhaps stimulus knowledge would be-
come a much more important determinant of JKs. 
General Conclusions and Implications. The present 
experiment demonstrates that learners can predict what 
will be recalled with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 
This "ability to know what you know" benefits from the 
knowledge of the success of previous retrieval attempts. 
Therefore, this implies that students' study habits should 
include self-testing. Self-testing or practice testing 
would lead to an accurate assessment of what is known and 
thus study time could efficiently be allocated to that 
which is not known. Furthermore, since JK accuracy gen-
erally improved with increasing familiarity with specific 
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learning and testing procedures, the ability to know what 
is known can be said to depend on an understanding of the 
manner in which the information will be tested. With 
greater practice with a certain type of test or with a 
certain kind of to-be-learned material, accuracy of know-
ing what is known will increase. 
A limitation of the present experiment was that only 
one type of stimulus material and one type of testing pro-
cedure were employed. Subsequent research should deter-
mine the degree to which prediction ability or experience 
acquired during PA learning transfers to other learning 
situations. For example, does the experience of predicting 
PA recall facilitate the prediction of sentence retention? 
Furthermore, in addition to the prediction of recall, can 
subjects accurately predict which items will be recognized? 
Future research should answer these questions. 
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1. nos--gadfly 
2. lom--offshoot 
3. tol--deceit 
4. kew--nephew 
5. yep--unit 
6. laq--session 
7. lem- -charter 
8. pum--venom 
9. mac--tidbit 
10. wer--buffoon 
11. bik--madness 
12. vam--folly 
13. dut--upkeep 
14. nup--abbess 
15. fub--encore 
16. lur--item 
17. dal--garret 
18. tux--concept 
19. nes--impact 
20. pom--chloride 
21. siz--pressure 
22. dow--impulse 
23. hib--reflex 
24. mik--boredom 
APPENDIX A 
Paired-Associate Lists 
het--foible 
wof--preview 
buk--adage 
tem--maker 
gel--nonsense 
vug--research 
hup- -vapor 
dof--proxy 
mot--friction 
ril--frontage 
xic--hatred 
raq--vigor 
tif--patent 
neb--array 
kav--outcome 
ren- -prestige 
fis- -rating 
wes--workhouse 
rox--hearing 
jor--tribute 
fer--victim 
bod--kindness 
fow--crisis 
las--rosin 
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kol--chaos 
nep--belief 
gos--welfare 
fen--traction 
yeg--savant 
fim--namesake 
sek--vision 
gid--context 
jow--forethought 
nas--steerage 
lor--essence 
hus--blessing 
jun- -franchise 
cuz--feline 
fok--hardship 
tog--satire 
dil--assault 
rew--onslaught 
cid--hindrance 
gur--gender 
pit- -mischief 
bov--northwest 
sik--malice 
lox--surtax 
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